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# Markovian decision processes with uncertain rewards 

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# MARKOVIAN DECISION PROCLSSES WITH UNCERTAIN REWARDS 

by<br>Franklin Kreamer Wolf<br>A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Partial Fulfillment of The Requirements for the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY<br>Major Subjects: Engineering Valuation Statistics

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## I. INTRODUCTION AND REVIEV OF LITERATURE

Consider a system which may be defined as a stochastic process whose realization is a series of transitions between a finite number of states. If the probability of cransition to another state depends only on the current state of the system and not on the series of transitions leading to the current state, the process may be called a Markov chain. Suppose that a reward is generated immediately after each transition and that the value of the reward depends on the state of the system prior to and immediately after the transition. For a given number of transitions, the expected value of the sum of future rewards will be called the value of the system. Also suppose that one or more altematives are associated with each state. Prior to the next transition one of the alternatives must be selected; the alternative selected will determine the probability of transition to other states and the value of the reward received due to the transition. The duty of a decision maker is to choose alternatives in a manner which will maximize the value of the system. Bellman (2) has called this model a Markovian decision process.

A Markovian decision process can be classified into discounted and non-discounted models. Call $\beta, 0<\beta<1$, the discount factor and discount the reward received due to the $h+1^{\text {th }}$ transition by $\beta^{h}$. The value of the discounted model is the expected value of the sum of discounted rewards and, under weak restrictions, will be bounded in the infinite trasition horizon situation. Two arguments for concentrating on the discounted model follow. First is the psychological consideration that a reward received immediately has a greater intrinsic value than the
same reward received at a future date, and that the same reward received in the infinite future would have no value. Another view might be taken by the engineering economist who would equate the discount factor $\beta^{h}$ to the present worth factor $(1+i)^{-h}$, where 1 is the effective rate of interest for the period of time between transitions. In this context the value of the discounted model could be labled the present worth of future rewards.

The stochastic process describing the state transitions could be other than a Markov process. However, the Markov process is mathematically tractable and is often a satisfactory assumption when modeling a physical system. Examples are found in many areas including inventory control (8), production planning (14), equipment replacement (13) and Marketing (10). Numerous examples are also fosmd in the natural and physical sciences. Howard (12) draws on the extensive accumulated knowledge of the properties of a Markov process and on work hy Bellman (2) to define, with admirable simplicity, the Markovian decision process as a dynamic programing problem. A major contribution by Howard is the development of a procedure to determine the maximum value of a system when the state transition horizon is infinite. Manne (15), Wagner (20) and Deman (7) formulated Howard's model as a linear programing problem, thus establishing an interesting link between dynamic and linear programing.

Howard assumed the transition probabilities and the rewards to be constants. An extension of the Markovian decision process is obtained by presuming that the decision maker is uncertain of either the transition probabilities or the reward structure. The decision maker faces the dual problem of choosing alternatives to maximize the value of the system and
using the information gained from observation of past transitions or rewards to improve the quality of future decisions, thus suggesting the addition of a Bayesian component to the Markovian decision process. Robbins (18), in a paper written before Howard's work, raised a question related to this problem. Given two statistical distributions and knowing only the class of these distributions, what sequential sampling strategy will maximize $E\left(S_{n}\right), S_{n}=x_{1}+x_{2}+\ldots+x_{n}$, when $x_{1}$ may be drawn from either distribution? Modification of this problem by the assignment of some prior knowledge of the two distributions leads to the "two-amed bandit" problem discussed in papers by Bradt, Johnson and Karlin (6) and Feldman (9), and a variation of the problem by Box and Hill (5).

Martin (16) first considered the Markovian decision process described by howard, and then assumed the transition probabilities to be random variables with uncertain parameters. The parameters are described by prior distributions. A strategy will depend on the past history of transitions, and the expected value of the sum of future rewards is conditioned on the history of transitions. To obtain a computable model Martin required the prior distributions to be natural conjugates of the densities of the transition probabilities. Raiffa and Schlaifer (17) analyse this ropic in some detail. Silver (19) considered convenient prior distributions to use with reward distributions. Others, including Billingsley (4) and Anderson and Goodman (1), have considered statistics associated with Markov chains. This thesis is primarily concemed with a Markovian decision process with transitions occurring at fixed intervals of time, state stationary probabilities and discounted rewards. It differs from previous models by assuming uncertain rewards. The rewards are considered to be random
variables from a known class of distributions. The parameters of these distributions are described by a set of prior distributions. Chapter II considers a general decision model with uncertain rewards which places few restrictions on the stochastic process involved. A less general model is developed by restricting the manner in which transitions and rewards are generated. A recursive equation of the value of the system is developed. Chapter III applies the results of the preceding chapter to a Markovian decision process with uncertain rewards. This allows the modification of previous notation to a more economical form. Chapter IV examines the Narkovian decision process when the rewards are generated by a Bernoulii process with a beta prior density function. A strategy is defined and several theorems by Martin (16) concerning the existence and uniqueness of the value of the system are given. Chapter $V$ is concerned with a method of calculating the value of a system when the state transition horizon is infinite. Upper and lower bounds for the vailie are developed as well as a method of selecting the alternative which should be chosen to govern the next transition.

## II. A DECISION PROCES: WITM UNCEPTAIN REUARDS

Before proceeding to a discussion of a Markovian decision process with uncertain rewards, a more general decision process with uncertain rewards will be examined. The reader may find the general model to be an interesting topic in its own right, and the results of this chapter are of direct use in Chapter III.

## A. A Generai Decision Model

Consider a system which must be in one of a finite number of states. At discrete intervals of time the system undergoes transitions which allow it to change state. Immediately after each transition, the decision maker receives a reward; the value of the reward received due to the $h^{\text {th }}$ transition is discounted by $\beta^{h-1}, 0 \leq \beta<1$. The value of the system is defined to be the expected value of the sum of the discounted rewards received over a specified number of transitions. The transition horizon is the number of transitions remaining before termination and may be infinite. Prior to each transition the decision maker selects a single course of action from among the altematives available; the set of available alternatives is a function of the current state of the system. It is assumed that the decision maker has available to him the record of transitions, rewards received and alternatives used. The altemative chosen will govern both the transition and the reward received. Future transitions and rewards may be dependent on the previous transitions and rewards. Uncertainty conceming the reward enters the model by assuming the reward to be a sample from a distribution with an unknown parameter, and a prior distribution of the parameter is specifled,

It is now necessary to briefly describe a strategy for a decision process with uncertain rewards. A more thorough description for a Markovian decision process with Bernoulli rewards is found in section $C$ of Chapter IV. As mentioned, the decision maker is assumed to have perfect knowledge of past transitions and rewards. When the system is in an initial state $i_{0}$ and $a$ transitions remain before termination, the decision maker can specify the alternative to be chosen to govern the first transition; call this specification $k^{\mathcal{I}}\left(i_{0}, n\right)$. Denote the states and rewards by

$$
\begin{align*}
& i_{h}=\text { state of the system after the } h^{\text {th }} \text { transition, } \\
& R_{h}=\text { reward received due to the } h^{\text {th }} \text { transition. } \tag{2.1}
\end{align*}
$$

A bar superscript signifies a $1 \times h$ vector, e.g. $\bar{I}_{h}=\left(1_{1}, i_{2}, \ldots I_{h}\right)$. The alternative chosen to govern the second transition will depend on the result of the first transition, $i_{1}$ and $R_{1}$, which was governed by the specification $k^{l}\left(i_{0}, n\right)$. Denote the specifications used for the second transition by $k_{i_{1}, R_{1}}^{2}\left(i_{0}, n\right)$. The alternative chosen to govern the $h^{\text {th }}$ ( $h \leq \pi$ ) transition will be a function of all previous transitions and rewards. Denote the specifications for the $h^{\text {th }}$ transition by

$$
\begin{equation*}
\bar{k}_{i_{h-1}}, \bar{R}_{h-1}\left(i_{0} ; n\right) \tag{2.2}
\end{equation*}
$$

The number of specifications with the superscript $h$ is equal to the number of possible histories of transitions and rewards leading to the $h^{\text {th }}$ transition. For a particular history leading through the first
h-1 transitions, specification (2.2) dictates the alternative to be chosen to govern the $h^{\text {th }}$ transition. The collection of specifications $k_{i_{h-1}}^{h}, \bar{R}_{h-1}\left(i_{0}, n\right), h=1,2, \ldots n^{\prime}$ is a strategy $D\left(i_{0}, n\right)$. This strategy specifies the alternative to be $h \frac{\text { hosen prior to any transition in the }}{}$ horizon for all possible histories leading to that transition. Note that the strategy $D\left(i_{0}, \pi\right)$ can be partitioned into those specifications pertaining to the first $h$ transitions and those specifications pertaining to the last $n-h$ transitions; in addition, the specifications which pertain only to the $h^{\text {th }}$ transition may be considered. This allows the following definitions.

| $D^{\text {h }}$ | = those specifications of $D\left(1_{0}, n\right)$ pertaining to the first $h$ transitions. |
| :---: | :---: |
| $\frac{D^{n-h}}{\bar{I}_{h}} \cdot \bar{R}_{h}$ | = those specifications of $D\left(I_{0}, n\right)$ pertaining to the final $n-h$ transitions given the |
|  | history $\bar{I}_{n}, \bar{R}_{h}$. |
| $\begin{equation*} {\stackrel{k}{I_{h-1}}}^{\bar{I}_{h-1}} \tag{2,3} \end{equation*}$ | = those specifications of $D\left(i_{0}, n\right)$ pertaining to the $h^{\text {th }}$ transition. |

The most generalized decision model considered in this thesis is developed using the following additional symbols.
$\beta=$ a discount factor, $0 \leq \beta<1$
$m_{h}$ - a random variable representing the parameter of the
distribution from which $R_{h}$ is sampled.

Let the following stochastic triple represent the realization of the $h^{\text {th }}$ transition.

$$
\begin{equation*}
\left\{i_{h}, m_{h}, R_{h}\right\}=a_{h} \tag{2.5}
\end{equation*}
$$

Since only $i_{h}$ and $R_{h}$ are observable, it is convenient to define

$$
\begin{equation*}
\left\{i_{h}, p_{n}\right\}=b_{h} . \tag{2.6}
\end{equation*}
$$

When the system is initially in state $i_{0}$ and strategy $D^{n}=D\left(i_{0}, n\right)$ is used, denote the joint likelihood of the sequence $\left\{1_{1}, m_{1}, R_{1}\right\}$, $\left\{i_{2}, m_{2}, R_{2}\right\}, \ldots\left\{i_{n}, m_{n}, R_{n}\right\}$ by

$$
\begin{equation*}
\pi_{a_{1}, a_{2}, \ldots a_{n}}\left(\ldots ; i_{0}, D^{n}\right) \tag{2.7}
\end{equation*}
$$

Since the sequence $a_{1}, a_{2}, \ldots a_{h}$ cannot depend on any member of $D^{n}$ other than the members of $D^{h}$, the marginal likelihood of $a_{1}, a_{2}, \ldots a_{h}$ may be written

$$
\begin{gather*}
\int_{a_{h+1}} \int_{a_{h+2}} \cdots \int_{a_{n}} \pi_{a_{1}, a_{2}, \ldots a_{n}\left(\ldots ; i_{0}, n^{h}\right) d a_{n} \ldots d a_{h+2} d a_{h+1}} \\
\quad=\pi_{a_{1}, a_{2}}^{*} \ldots a_{h}\left(\ldots ; i_{0}, D^{h}\right) \tag{2.8}
\end{gather*}
$$

The conditional likelihood of $a_{h}$ given $a_{1}, a_{2}, \ldots a_{h-1}$ depends only on those members of $D^{n}$ which pertain to the choice of alternatives to
govern the $h^{\text {th }}$ transition, and is written

$$
\begin{equation*}
\pi_{a_{h}}\left(. / \bar{a}_{h-1} ; i_{0} \cdot \frac{k^{h}}{\bar{b}_{h-1}}\right)=\frac{\bar{\pi}_{\bar{a}_{h}}^{*}\left(\ldots ; i_{0}: D^{h}\right)}{\bar{\pi}_{a_{h-1}}^{*}\left(\ldots ; i_{0}, D^{h-1}\right)} \tag{2.9}
\end{equation*}
$$

Analogously, the conditional likelinood of the sequence $a_{n}, a_{h+1}, \ldots a_{n}$ given $a_{1}, a_{2}, \ldots a_{n-1}$ depends on the members of $D^{n}$ pertaining to the final $n-h$ transitions and is written

$$
\begin{align*}
\pi_{a_{n}} \cdot a_{h+1} & \ldots a_{n}\left(\ldots / a_{1} ; a_{2} ; \ldots a_{h-1} ; 1_{0}: \frac{D^{n-h}}{b_{h-1}}\right) \\
& =\frac{\pi_{a_{1}, a_{2}, \ldots a_{n}\left(\ldots ; i_{0}, D^{n}\right)}^{\pi_{a_{1}}^{*}, a_{2}, \ldots a_{h-1}}\left(\ldots ; 1_{0}, D^{h-1}\right)}{} \tag{2,10}
\end{align*}
$$

When a system which started in state $I_{0}$ has $n-h$ eransitions remsining until termination, the sequence $a_{1}, a_{2}, \ldots a_{h}$ has occurred and strategy $D\left(i_{0}, n\right)=D^{n}$ is being used, denote the expected value of the sum of the remaining $n-h$ discounted rewards by

$$
\begin{equation*}
w\left(a_{1}: a_{2}, \ldots a_{h} ; 1_{0} \cdot \frac{D^{n-h}}{b_{h}}\right) \tag{2.11}
\end{equation*}
$$

Use the dumany variable $a_{0}$ to denote the lack of history when writing the value of the system before the first transition.

The expected value of the sum of the discounted rewairds when the
systerl is in state $i_{0}$ and strategy $D\left(i_{0}, n\right)$ is used is

$$
\begin{aligned}
& w\left(a_{0} ; 1_{0}, D^{n}\right)= \iint_{a_{1}} \ldots a_{2} \int_{n} \pi_{a_{1}, a_{2}, \ldots a_{n}\left(a_{1}, a_{2}, \ldots a_{n} ; 1_{0}, D^{n}\right)} \\
& \therefore \\
& \times\left(R_{1}+B R_{2}+\ldots+\beta^{n-1} R_{n}\right) d a_{n}, \ldots d a_{2}, d a_{1},(2,12)
\end{aligned}
$$

In the following chapters, the desirability of writing equation (2.12) in a recursive form will become evident. As the first step in this direction, write equation (2.12) in the following manner:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& w\left(a_{0} ; i_{0} \cdot D^{n}\right)=\int_{a_{1}} R_{1} \cdot \pi_{a_{1}}^{*}\left(a_{1} ; i_{0} ; D^{1}\right) d a_{1} \\
& +\beta \int_{a_{1}} \int_{a_{2}} \cdots \int_{a_{n}} \pi_{a_{1}, a_{2}} \ldots a_{n}\left(a_{1}, a_{2}, \ldots a_{n} ; i_{0,} D^{n}\right) \\
& x\left(R_{2}+\beta R_{3}+\ldots+\beta^{n-2} R_{n}\right) d a_{n} \ldots d a_{2} \cdot d a_{1} \\
& =\int_{a_{1}} R_{1} \cdot \pi_{a_{i}}^{*}\left(a_{1} ; i_{0} \cdot D^{1}\right) d a_{1} \\
& +\beta \int_{a_{1}} \pi_{a_{1}}^{*}\left(a_{1} ; i_{0}, D^{l}\right) \\
& \times\left[\int_{a_{2}} \int_{3} \ldots \int_{a_{n}} \frac{\pi_{a_{1}}, a_{2}, \ldots a_{n}\left(a_{1}, a_{2}, \ldots a_{n} ; 1_{0}, D^{n}\right)}{\pi_{a_{1}}^{*}\left(a_{1} ; 1_{0} ; D^{1}\right)}\right. \\
& \left.x\left(R_{2}+\beta R_{3}+\ldots+\beta^{n-2} R_{n}\right) d a_{n} \ldots d a_{3}, d a_{2}\right] d a_{1}
\end{aligned}
$$

$$
\begin{align*}
& =\int_{a_{1}} R_{1} \cdot \pi_{a_{1}}^{*}\left(a_{1} ; i_{0}, D^{1}\right) d a_{1} \\
& \quad+\beta \int a_{a_{1}} R_{1} \cdot \pi_{a_{1}}^{*}\left(a_{1} ; i_{0}, D^{1}\right) \\
& \quad \times\left[\int_{a_{2}} \int_{a_{3}} \ldots \int_{n} \pi_{a_{2}}^{*}, a_{3}, \ldots a_{n}\left(a_{2}, a_{3}, \ldots a_{n} / a_{1} ; 1_{0}, D_{b_{1}}^{n-1}\right)\right. \\
& \quad \times\left(R_{2}+\beta R_{3}+\ldots \sigma^{\left.\left.n-2_{R_{n}}\right) d a_{n} \ldots d a_{3} d a_{2}\right] d a_{1} .} .\right. \tag{2.13}
\end{align*}
$$

The first addend of equation (2.13) is the expected value of the immediate reward (the reward received due to the next transition), and the second the expected value of the sum of the remaining discounted rewards. The value of the last $n-1$ transitions given an is

$$
\begin{align*}
& w\left(a_{1} ; i_{0}, \frac{\left.D_{\overline{b_{1}}}^{n-1}\right)=}{} \int_{a_{2}} \int_{3} \ldots \int_{a_{n}} \pi_{a_{2}}, a_{3}, \ldots a_{n}\left(a_{2}, a_{3}, \ldots a_{n} / a_{1} ; i_{0}, \frac{D_{\bar{b}}^{n-1}}{b_{1}}\right)\right. \\
& \times\left(R_{2}+\beta R_{3}+\ldots+\beta^{n-2} R_{n}\right) d a_{n} \ldots d a_{3} d a_{2} . \tag{2.14}
\end{align*}
$$

Equations (2.12) can now be written in the following recursive form.

$$
\begin{align*}
w\left(a_{0} ; i_{0}, D^{n}\right)= & \int_{a_{1}} R_{1} \pi_{a_{1}}^{*}\left(a_{1} ; i_{0}, D^{l}\right) d a_{1} \\
& +\beta \int_{a_{1}} \pi_{a_{1}}^{*}\left(a_{1} ; 1_{0}, D^{1}\right) w\left(a_{1} ; 1_{0}, \frac{D_{\bar{b}}^{1}}{n-1}\right) d a_{1} \tag{2.15}
\end{align*}
$$

The maximum value of the system and a strategy which will achieve that value are of major interest to the decision maker. Now introduced are some problems that will be approached in greater detail in the following chapters, particularly Chapter IV.

If $\Delta\left(i_{0}, n\right)$ is the set of all strategies $D\left(i_{0}, n\right)$ then define

$$
\begin{equation*}
v\left(a_{0} ; i_{0}, n\right)=\sup _{D\left(i_{0}, n\right) \varepsilon \Delta\left(i_{0}, n\right)}\left\{w\left(a_{0} ; i_{0}, D\left(i_{0}, n\right)\right)\right\} \tag{2.16}
\end{equation*}
$$

In the same sense, $v\left(\bar{a}_{h} ; i_{0}, n-h\right)$ will denote the supremum of the expected value of the sum of the discounted rewards due to the remaining $n-h$ transitions, given that the sequence $a_{1}, a_{2}, \ldots a_{h}$ has occurred. Equation (2.15) suggests a dynamic orogramming problem and application of Bellman's "Principle of Optimality" (3). Represent the alternative chosen by the decision maker to govern the $h^{\text {th }}$ transition by $k_{h},\left(k_{h}=1,2, \ldots\right.$ $K_{i}$ ), where $K_{i}$ is the number of alternatives avallable when the system is in state $i$. In equation (2.15), replace $D^{1}$, the alternative chosen to govern the first transition under strategy $D\left(i_{0}, n\right)$, by $k_{1}$ and write

$$
\begin{align*}
v\left(a_{0} ; I_{0} ; n\right)= & \max _{1 \leq k_{1} \leq k_{i_{0}}}\left\{\int_{a_{1}} R_{1} \pi_{a_{1}}^{*}\left(a_{1} ; i_{0} ; k_{1}\right) d a_{1}\right. \\
& \left.+\beta \int_{a_{1}} \pi_{a_{1}}^{*}\left(a_{1} ; i_{0}, k_{1}\right) v\left(a_{1} ; i_{0}, n-1\right) d a_{1}\right\} . \tag{2.17}
\end{align*}
$$

When an infinite transition horizon is considered, the parameter $n$ will be dropped from the symbols denoting a strategy and the value of the system. In this case equation (2.16) will be written

$$
\begin{equation*}
v\left(a_{0} ; i_{0}\right)=\sup _{D\left(i_{0}\right) \in \Delta\left(i_{0}\right)}\left\{w\left(a_{0} ; i_{0} ; D\left(i_{0}\right)\right)\right\} . \tag{2.18}
\end{equation*}
$$

Of interest are the conditions under which

$$
\begin{equation*}
\lim _{n \rightarrow \infty} v\left(a_{0} ; 1_{0}, n\right)=v\left(a_{0} ; i_{0}\right) ; \tag{2.19}
\end{equation*}
$$

this will be discussed in Chapter IV.

> B. A Less General Decision Process

Some restrictions will now be placed on the model of section $A$ of this chapter. A particular method of generating the conditional likelihood $\pi_{a_{h}}^{*}\left(a_{h} / \bar{a}_{h-1} ; 1_{0}, \frac{k_{b_{h-1}}^{h}}{\bar{b}_{h}}\right.$ ) under strategy $D\left(1_{0}, n\right)$ will be described and denoted. From this conditional likelihood, recursive equations similar to (2.15) and (2.17) but for the less general decision process with
uncertain rewards will be obtained.
Consider a process which generates the stochastic triple ( $i_{h}, m_{h}, R_{h}$ ) in the following manner. The probability of transition from state $i_{h-l}$ to state $i_{h}$ depends on the past history of states, $i_{1}, i_{2}, \ldots i_{h-1}$, and the alternative chosen to govem the $h^{\text {th }}$ transition. Denote this by

$$
\begin{equation*}
P_{i_{h}}\left(. / i_{1}, i_{2}, \ldots i_{h-1} ; i_{0}, k_{h}\right) . \tag{2.20}
\end{equation*}
$$

There is a reward distribution associated with each transition from state $i_{h-1}$ to state $i_{h}$ and each alternative available when in state $i_{h-1}$. If $N$ denotes the number of states in the system, there are $L=\sum_{i=1}^{N} N K_{i}=N \sum_{i=1}^{N} K_{i}$ reward distributions from which $R_{h}$ can be sampled. The particular distribution sampled is indexed by $I_{h-1}, i_{h}$ and $k_{h}$. Let $m_{h}$ represent the parameter of the sampled distribution and denote the likelihood of $R_{h}$ by

$$
\begin{equation*}
\ell_{R_{h}}\left(. / i_{h-1} ; i_{h} ; m_{h}, i_{h}\right) \tag{2.21}
\end{equation*}
$$

The decision maker is uncertain of the value of the parameter $m_{h}$ and views it as a random variable. Because there are $L$ distributions from which $R_{h}$ can be sampled, there are also $L$ distributions from which $m_{h}$ can be sampled. These distributions are also indexed by $i_{h-1}, i_{h}$ and $k_{h}$, so that with each reward distribution there is associated a distribution of $m_{h}$ with identical indices. As part of the initial conditions the decision maker must specify $L$ independent prior
distributions. The distribution from which $\mathrm{m}_{\mathrm{h}}$ is sampled is one of the set of $L$ prior distributions, the class of which is denoted by

$$
\begin{equation*}
\Phi_{m}(. / \psi)=\left\{\phi_{\mu}\left(. / \psi_{\mu}\right) ; \mu=1,2, \ldots L\right\} \tag{2.22}
\end{equation*}
$$

The specifications of the strategy discussed are dependent on the transitions and rewards observed, and the expected value of the system will be taken with respect to those observations. It will be necessary to compute the conditional distribution of $m_{h}$ given the observations $\bar{i}_{h-1}$ and $\overline{\mathrm{R}}_{\mathrm{h}-1}$; in Bayesian terminology this is the posterior distribution of $m_{h}$ and is denoted by

$$
\begin{equation*}
\phi_{m_{h}}\left(. / R_{1}, R_{2}, \ldots R_{h-1}, i_{1}, i_{2}, \ldots i_{h} ; i_{0}, k_{h}, \psi\right) \tag{2.23}
\end{equation*}
$$

Although it is necessary to state the alternatives chosen to govern the first h-l transitions to completely index the reward distributions sampled, these altematives are known when the strategy is specified and the history of transitions and rewards is given. The posterior distribution $(2,23)$ is obtained by application of Bayes theorem.

$$
\begin{align*}
& \phi_{m_{h}}\left(. / \bar{R}_{h-1}, \bar{i}_{h} ; i_{0} ; k_{h}, \psi\right)=\frac{\phi_{m_{h}}\left(. / \psi_{m_{h}}\right) \ell_{R_{1}}\left(R_{1} / i_{0}, i_{1} ; m_{1} ; k_{1}\right)}{\int_{m_{h}} \phi_{m_{h}}\left(m_{h} / \psi_{m_{h}}\right) \varepsilon_{R_{1}}\left(R_{1} / i_{0}, i_{1} ; m_{1}, k_{1}\right)} \\
& \times \frac{\ell_{R_{2}}\left(R_{2} / i_{1} ; i_{2} ; m_{2} ; k_{2}\right) \ldots \ell_{R_{h-1}}\left(R_{h-1} / i_{h-2} ; i_{h-1} ; m_{h-1} ; k_{h-1}\right)}{\ell_{R_{2}}\left(R_{2} / I_{1} ; i_{2} ; m_{2}, k_{2}\right) \ldots \ell_{R_{h-1}}\left(R_{h-1} / i_{h-2} ; i_{h-1} ; m_{h-1} ; k_{h-1}\right) d m_{h}} \tag{2.24}
\end{align*}
$$

Because it is difficult to devise an economical notation which records both the decision state and the distribution sampled, equation (2.24) is somewhat cumbersome. When the indices of the reward distribution sampled are not equal to $i_{h-1}, i_{h}$ and $k_{h}$, the indices determining $m_{h}$, the Iikelihood of that reward is functionally independent of $m_{h}$. Those likelihoods in the denominator which are functionally independent of $m_{h}$ can be placed outside the integral and will cancel with the corresponding likelihoods in the numerator. The fact that the posterior distribution of $m_{h}$ is altered only by rewards sampled from the reward distribution associated with $m_{h}$ is clear but somewhat obscured by the notation. One interpretation of the reward structure just described is that the decision maker knows the family of reward distributions but is uncertain of at least one of the distribution parameters. Specification of the unknown parameter as a random variable reflects the decision makers uncertainty. In spite of this uncertainty the decision maker must initially estimate $\psi$, a term containing the parameters of the prior distributions and indirectly representing a partial knowledge of the parameters of the reward distributions. The decision maker systematically updates his initial estimate of $\psi$ by conditioning the distribution of $m_{h}$ on past observations. In this manner the decision maker bases future decisions on both $\psi$ and the observed rewards. But he must not lose sight of the fact that the expected value of the system is functionally dependent on the initial estimate of $\psi$.

The foint likelihood ${\frac{\pi}{a_{n}}}\left(0 ; 1_{0}, D^{n}\right)$ of $(2.7)$ can be written to include the additional parameter $\psi$.

$$
\begin{align*}
& \pi_{\bar{a}_{n}}\left(. ; i_{0}, D^{n}, \psi\right)=P_{i_{1}}\left(. ; i_{0}, \frac{k_{\bar{b}_{0}}^{1}}{}, \psi\right) \phi_{m_{1}}\left(. / \bar{i}_{1} ; I_{0}, \frac{\bar{b}_{\bar{b}_{0}}^{1}}{0}, \psi\right) \\
& \times \ell_{R_{1}}\left(. / \bar{i}_{1}, \bar{m}_{1} ; i_{0}, \frac{\left.k_{\bar{b}_{0}}^{l}, \psi\right) P_{i_{2}}\left(. / \bar{i}_{1}, \bar{m}_{1}, \bar{R}_{1} ; i_{0}, \frac{\bar{x}_{1}^{2}}{\bar{b}_{1}}, \psi\right)}{}\right. \\
& \times \phi_{m_{2}}\left(. / \bar{i}_{2}, \bar{m}_{1}, \bar{R}_{1} ; i_{0}, \frac{k^{2}}{\bar{b}_{1}}, \psi\right) \ell_{R_{2}}\left(. / \bar{I}_{2}, \bar{m}_{2}, \bar{R}_{1} ; i_{0}, \bar{k}_{\bar{b}_{1}}^{2}, \psi\right) \ldots \\
& P_{i_{n}}\left(. / \bar{i}_{n-1}, \bar{m}_{n-1}, \bar{R}_{n-1} ; i_{0},{\frac{k^{\Sigma_{1}}}{\bar{b}_{n-1}}}, \psi\right) \\
& \times \phi_{n_{n}}\left(. / \bar{i}_{n}, \bar{m}_{n-1}, \bar{R}_{n-1} ; i_{0}, \frac{\left.k_{\bar{b}_{n-1}}, \psi\right)}{}\right. \\
& \times \ell_{R_{n}}\left(. / \bar{I}_{n}, \bar{m}_{n}, \bar{R}_{n-1} ; I_{0}, \frac{k^{n}}{\bar{b}_{n-1}}, \psi\right) \quad . \tag{2.25}
\end{align*}
$$

From equation (2.9), the conditional distribution of $a_{h}$ given $\bar{a}_{h-1}$, is

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \pi_{a_{h}}\left(. / \bar{a}_{h-1} ; i_{0},{\frac{k^{h}}{b_{h-1}}}^{h}=\psi\right)=p_{i_{h}}\left(. / \bar{i}_{h-1} ; \bar{m}_{h-1}, \bar{R}_{h-1} ; i_{0},{\frac{k^{h}}{b_{h-1}}}^{h}, \psi\right) \\
& \quad \times \phi_{m_{h}}\left(. / \bar{i}_{h}, \bar{m}_{h-1}, \bar{R}_{h-1} ; 1_{0},{\frac{k}{\bar{b}_{h-1}}}_{h}, \psi\right)
\end{aligned}
$$

$$
\begin{equation*}
\times \ell_{R_{h}}\left(. / \bar{I}_{h}, \bar{m}_{h}, \bar{R}_{h-1} ; 1_{0},{\frac{k}{b_{h-1}}}_{h}^{\bar{b}_{h}}, \psi\right) . \tag{2.26}
\end{equation*}
$$

The assumptions made when describing the less general decision process allow equation (2.26) to be written

$$
\begin{align*}
& \pi_{a_{h}}\left(.1 \bar{a}_{h-1} ; i_{0}, k_{\bar{b}_{h-1}}^{h} ; \psi\right)=p_{i_{h}}\left(. / \bar{i}_{h-1} ; i_{0},{\frac{k}{b_{h-1}}}_{h}\right) \\
& \quad \times \phi_{m_{h}}\left(. / \bar{R}_{h-1}, \bar{i}_{h} ; i_{0}, k_{\bar{b}_{h-1}}^{h}, \psi\right) l_{R_{h}}\left(. / i_{h-1}, i_{h}, m_{h} ; k_{\bar{b}_{h-1}}^{h_{n}}\right) . \tag{2.27}
\end{align*}
$$

An equation analogous to equation (2.15) but expressing the expected value of the sum of discounted rewards for the less general decision process when strategy $D\left(i_{0}, n\right)$ is used can now be written

$$
\begin{aligned}
& w\left(a_{0} ; I_{0}, D^{n}, \psi\right)=\iint_{i_{1}} \int_{m_{1}} R_{1} \cdot P_{i_{1}}\left(i_{1} / \bar{i}_{0} ; i_{0}, \frac{k^{1}}{\bar{b}_{0}}\right) \\
& \times \phi_{m_{1}}\left(m_{1} / \bar{R}_{0}, \bar{I}_{0} ; i_{0}, \frac{k}{l}_{\bar{b}_{0}}^{l}, \psi\right) \ell_{R_{1}}\left(R_{1} / I_{0}, i_{1}, m_{1} ; \bar{b}_{0}^{l}\right) d R_{1} d m_{1} d i_{1} \\
& +\beta \iint_{i_{1} m_{1}} \int_{R_{1}} P_{i_{1}}\left(i_{1} / \bar{i}_{0} ; i_{0} ; \bar{k}_{b_{0}}^{1}\right) \phi_{m_{1}}\left(m_{1} / \bar{R}_{0}, \bar{i}_{0} ; i_{0}, \frac{k^{1}}{b_{0}} ; \psi\right)
\end{aligned}
$$

$$
\begin{equation*}
\times \ell_{R_{1}}\left(R_{1} / i_{0}, i_{1}, m ; \frac{k^{1}}{\bar{b}_{0}}\right) w\left(a_{1} ; i_{0}, \frac{1 \bar{b}_{1}}{\mathrm{n}_{1}}, \psi\right) d F_{1} d m_{1} d i_{1}, \tag{2.28}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $\bar{i}_{0}, \bar{R}_{0}$ and $\bar{b}_{0}$ are dummy variables representing the lack of history on the first transition. The equation similar to equation (2.17) but for the less general decision process is

$$
\begin{align*}
& v\left(a_{0} ; i_{0}, n, \psi\right)=\max _{1 \leq k \leq R_{i_{0}}}\left\{\iint_{i_{1} m_{1} R_{1}} \int_{R_{1}} \cdot P_{i_{1}}\left(i_{1} / \bar{i}_{0} ; i_{0}, k\right)\right. \\
& \quad \times \phi_{m_{1}}\left(m_{1} / \bar{R}_{0}, \bar{i}_{0} ; i_{0}, k, \psi\right) l_{R_{1}}\left(R_{1} / i_{0}, i_{1}, m_{1} ; k\right) d R_{1} d m_{1} d i_{1} \\
& \quad+B \iint_{i_{1}} \int_{1} R_{1} P_{i_{1}}\left(I_{1} / \bar{i}_{0} ; i_{0}, k\right) \phi_{m_{1}}\left(m_{1} / \bar{R}_{0}, \bar{i}_{0} ; i_{0}, k, \psi\right) \\
& \left.\quad \times \ell_{R_{1}}\left(R_{1} / i_{0}, i_{1}, m_{1} ; k\right) v\left(a_{1} ; i_{0}, n-1, \psi\right) d k_{1} d m_{1} d i_{1}\right\} \tag{2.29}
\end{align*}
$$

iII. A MARKOVIAN DECISION PROCESS WITH UNCERTAIN REWARDS

The models of the preceding chapter did not restrict the probability structure underlying the state transitions. By assuming that the state transitions can be described by a stationary Markov chain, the results of Chapter II can be modified to specify the characteristics of a Markovian decision process with uncertain rewards. The singular properties of the stationary : :arkov chain, as applied to the decision process being considered, are that the conditional probability of transition to state $i_{h}$ given the transition history $i_{0}, i_{1}, \ldots i_{h-l}$, is dependent only on state $i_{h-1}$ and the alternative chosen to govern the $h^{\text {th }}$ decision; the probability is functionally independent of the state history leading to $1_{h-1}$. Stationarity refers to the functional independence of the transition probability and the number of previous transitions. Assuming that the state transition probabilities are represented by a stationary Markov chain, the probability $(2.20)$ may be written

$$
\begin{equation*}
P_{i_{h}}\left(. / \bar{i}_{h-1} ; i_{0}, k_{h}\right)=P_{i_{h}}\left(. / i_{h-1} ; k_{h}\right) . \tag{3.1}
\end{equation*}
$$

Equation (2.28) stated the expected value of the sum of future discounted rewards under strategy $D\left(i_{0} ; n\right)$ for the less general model. For a Markovian decision process with uncertain rewards, the value of the system is

$$
w\left(a_{0} ; i_{0}, D^{n}, \psi\right)=\sum_{i_{1}=1}^{N} \int_{m_{1}} \int_{R_{1}} R_{1} \cdot P_{i_{1}}\left(i_{1} / i_{0}, \frac{k^{1}}{b_{0}}\right)
$$

$$
\begin{align*}
& x \phi_{m_{1}}\left(m_{1} / \bar{R}_{0}, \bar{i}_{0} ; I_{0}, \frac{k_{b_{0}}^{l}}{b_{0}}, \psi\right) \ell_{R_{1}}\left(R_{1} / 1_{0}, I_{1}, m_{1} ; \frac{k_{0}^{1}}{b_{0}}\right) d R_{1} d m_{1} \\
& +\beta \sum_{i_{1}=1}^{N} \int_{m_{1}} \int_{R_{1}} P_{i_{1}}\left(1_{1} / 1_{0} ;{\frac{k}{b_{0}}}_{\bar{b}_{0}}\right) \phi_{m_{1}}\left(m_{1} / \bar{R}_{0}, \bar{i}_{0} ; i_{0}, \frac{k^{1}}{\bar{b}_{0}}, \psi\right) \\
& \times \ell_{R_{1}}\left(R_{1} / I_{0}, i_{1}, m_{1} ; \frac{k^{1}}{b_{0}}\right) w\left(a_{1} ; i_{0}, \frac{D^{n-1}}{b_{1}}, \psi\right) d R_{1} d m_{1} \tag{3.2}
\end{align*}
$$

It is possible to write equation (3.2) in a more compact form by modifying some of the notation of Chapter II. Rather than specifying the state of the system before and after the $h^{\text {th }}$ transition by $i_{h-1}$ and $i_{h}$, use, wisen possible, the indices $i$ and $j$ to refer directly to the state of the system. Use the following notation for a Markovian decision process.

$$
\begin{aligned}
& P_{i, j}^{k} \quad=\text { the probability of transition from state } 1 \text { to } \\
& \text { state } j \text { when alternative } k \text { governs the transition. } \\
& \ell_{i, j}^{k}(. / m)=\text { the likelihood finaction of the reward received due }
\end{aligned}
$$

$$
\begin{align*}
\phi_{i, j}^{k}\left(. / R_{1},\right. & \left.R_{2}, \ldots R_{h-1}, i_{1}, i_{2} \ldots i_{h-2} ; i_{0}, \psi\right)= \\
& \text { the posterior density function of } m \text { indexed } \\
& \text { by } i_{,} j \text { and } k \text { and conditional on the obser- } \\
& \text { vations } R_{1}, R_{2}, \ldots R_{h-1} ; \text { let } i=i_{h-1} \text { and } \\
& f=i_{h} . \tag{3.3}
\end{align*}
$$

Reduce the notation required when denoting the posterior distribution of $m$ by letting

$$
\begin{equation*}
\phi_{1, j}^{k_{h}}\left(. / \bar{E}_{h-1}, \bar{I}_{h-2} ; i_{0}, \psi\right)=\phi_{i, j}^{k_{h}}\left(. ; \psi^{h}\right) . \tag{3.4}
\end{equation*}
$$

This notation may be taken to imply that the posterior distribution of $m$ is of the same family as the prior distribution, with $\psi^{h}$ denoting the value of the parameters of the prior distributions updated through the (h-1) th transition. Chapter IV considers a reward structure of this type. The author is indebted to J. J. Martin whose book (16) suggested the following notation. Let $\mathrm{I}_{i, j}^{k}(\mathrm{R}, \psi)$ denote the parameters of the posterior distributions given one additional reward observation $R$ sampled from the distribution indexed by 1 , $f$ and $k$, so that

$$
\begin{equation*}
\phi_{i, j}^{k}(\cdot / R ; \psi)=\frac{\phi_{i, j}^{k}(\cdot ; \psi) l_{i, j}^{k}(R / m)}{\int_{m} \phi_{i, j}^{k}(m ; \psi) l_{i, j}^{k}(R / m) d n}=\phi_{i, j}^{k}\left(\cdot ; T_{i, j}^{k}(R, \psi)\right) \tag{3.5}
\end{equation*}
$$

The conditional likelihood of $a_{h}$ given $\bar{a}_{h-1}$ for the less general decision model was specified in equation (2.27). For the Markovian
decision process, the analogous equation is

$$
\begin{equation*}
\pi_{a_{h}}\left(. / \bar{a}_{h-1} ; i_{0},{\frac{k}{b_{h-1}}}_{h}, \psi\right)=p_{i, j}^{k \frac{h}{b_{h-1}}} \ell_{i, j}^{k_{h-1}^{h}}(. / m) \phi_{i, j}^{\bar{b}_{h-1}^{h}}\left(. ; \psi^{h}\right) \tag{3.6}
\end{equation*}
$$

Before rewriting equation (3.2), consider the first addend on the right hand side of that equation, which represents the expected value of the reward received due to the next transition. When the system is in state $i$ prior to the $h^{\text {th }}$ transition, denote the expected value of $R_{h}$ by

$$
\begin{equation*}
q_{i}^{k_{h}}\left(\psi^{h}\right)=\sum_{j=1}^{N} \iint_{R} R \cdot p_{i, j}^{k_{h}} \phi_{i, j}^{k_{h}}\left(m ; \psi^{h}\right) e_{i, j}^{k_{h}}(R / m) d R d m \quad . \tag{3.7}
\end{equation*}
$$

The value of the sum of the remaining $n-h$ discounted rewards is now a function of the current state of the system and the updated parameters of the prior distributions. When $i_{h}=i_{\text {, let }}$

$$
\begin{equation*}
w\left(\bar{a}_{h} ; i_{0},{\left.\frac{D^{n-h}}{\bar{b}_{h}}, \psi\right)=w_{i}\left(\bar{b}_{\bar{b}_{h}}^{n-h}, \psi^{h+1}\right) . . . . . .}^{n}\right. \tag{3.8}
\end{equation*}
$$

Rewrite equation (3.2) using the notation developed in this chapter.

$$
\begin{equation*}
\times w_{j}\left(D^{n-1}, T_{i, j}^{\frac{T_{0}}{b_{0}}}(R, \psi)\right) d R d m \tag{3.9}
\end{equation*}
$$

The dynamic programing formulation of the Markovian decision process with uncertain rewards is

$$
\begin{align*}
& v_{i}(n, \psi)=\max _{1 \leq k \leq K_{i}}\left\{q_{i}^{k}(\psi)+\beta \sum_{j=1}^{N} \iint_{\mathbb{R}} \int_{R}^{k} p_{i, j} \phi_{i, j}^{k}(m ; \psi)\right. \\
& \left.\quad \times \sum_{i, j}^{k}(R / m) v_{j}\left(n-1, \mathbb{I}_{i, j}^{k}(R, \psi)\right) d R d m\right\} \quad \tag{3.10}
\end{align*}
$$

where $v_{i}(n, \psi)$ is the supremm of the value of the remaining $n$ transitions when the system is state 1 .

## IV. A MARKOVIAN DECISION PROCESS WITH UNCERTAIN BERNOULLI REWARDS

This chapter will analyse a Markovian decision process with uncertain rewards and with a specific reward structure. First a particular reward likelihood and prior distribution will be specified, and then the results of Chapter III will be used to obtain equations describing a Markovian decision process with Bernoulli rewards. A strategy for the case when the number of possible rewards is finite will then be described in detail. Finaliy the existence and uniqueness of $v_{i}(\dot{\psi})$, an optimal strategy and bounds of the function $\left|v_{1}(n, \psi)-v_{1}(\psi)\right|$ vill be considered.
A. A Discrete Reward Structure

The reward structure to be considered assumes that rewards are generated by a Bernoulli process. The parameter of this process is uncertain; this meertainty will be described by assuming the parameter to be a random variable defined by a prior distribution. Describe the likelihood of the reward sampled from the distribution indexed by i, $f$ and $k$ by

$$
\begin{align*}
& \ell_{1,1}^{k}(R / m)=m^{x}(1-m)^{1-x}, \\
& 0 \leq m \leq 1, \quad R=R(1), R(2), \quad x=1 \text { when } R=R(1) \\
& x=0 \text { when } R=R(2) \tag{4.1}
\end{align*}
$$

The parameter $m$ in $(4,1)$ is a random variable to which a prior distribution also indexed by $1, j$ and $k$ must be assigned. Two criteria
should be considered when selecting a prior distribution. First, the distribution must appeal to the model builder's intuition and seem a reasonable way in which to describe $m$. The second criterion is more objective. For the model to be useful, the posterior distribution of $m$ must be calculable. Raiffa and Schlaifer (17) have extensively examined the class of prior distributions which are natural confugates of the process (i.e. reward) distribution. The natural conjugate prior density function has the characteristic that the posterior density is of the same family as the prior density, and that the parameters of the posterior density are often simple functions of the parameters of the prior density. If the model builder's intuition allows him to reduce the set of candidates for the prior distribution to the natural conjugate prior, he will achieve a large return in terms of computability.

When rewards are generated by the Bernoulli process described in (4.1), the likelihood function of the sample $R_{1}, R_{2}, \ldots R_{t}$ from the distribution indexed by $1, j$ and $k$ is

$$
\begin{align*}
& \prod_{i=1}^{t} m^{x_{i}}(1-m)^{1-x_{i}}=m^{s}(1-m)^{t-s} ; \\
& s=\sum_{i=1}^{t} x_{i}, \quad x_{i}=1 \text { when } R_{i}=R(1) \\
& x_{i}=0 \text { when } R_{i}=R(2) \tag{4.2}
\end{align*}
$$

The natural conjugate prior density of the likelihood (4.1) is the beta distribution. This is verified by observing that the density function of the prior distribution varies as the likelihood function of the rewards.

$$
\begin{equation*}
f_{\text {beta }}(\pi ; s, t) \alpha m_{1}^{s-1}\left(1-\pi_{i}\right)^{t-s-1} \tag{4.3}
\end{equation*}
$$

When the beta distribution is chosen to describe $m$,

$$
\phi_{1, j}^{k}(m ; \psi)=\phi_{i, j}^{k}(m ; s, t)=\frac{1}{\beta(s, t-s)} m^{s-1}(1-m)^{t-8-1} .(4.4)
$$

Because the natural conjugate prior distribution has been selected, the posterior distribution is also a beta distribution with parameters as shown below.

$$
\begin{align*}
& m^{s-1}(1-m)^{t-s-1} \pi^{t^{\prime}} \pi^{x_{h}}(1-m)^{1-x_{h}} \\
& \phi_{i, f}^{k}\left(m / R_{1}, R_{2} ; \ldots R_{t} ; s, t\right)=\frac{h-1}{\int_{0}^{1} m^{s-1}(1-m)^{t-s-1} \prod_{h=1}^{t^{j}} m^{x_{h}}(1-m)^{1-x_{h}} d m} \\
& =\frac{1}{\beta\left(s+s^{\prime}, t+t^{\prime}-\left(a+s^{\prime}\right)\right)} m^{s+s^{\prime}-1}(1-m)^{t+t^{\prime}-\left(s+s^{\prime}\right)-1} \\
& -\phi_{1, j}^{k}\left(m ; s+s^{\prime}, t+t^{\prime}\right) \quad . \\
& s^{\prime}=\sum_{h=1}^{t^{\prime}} \quad x_{h}, \quad x_{h}=1 \text { when } R=R(1) \quad x_{h}=0 \text { when } R=R(2) \quad . \tag{4.5}
\end{align*}
$$

As indicated, the parameters of the posterior are a simple function of the parameters of the prior, the total number of observations and the number of those observations equal $R(1)$.

The marginai aistribution of $: i$ is

$$
\begin{align*}
& \ell_{i, j}^{k}(R ; \psi)=\ell_{i, j}^{k}(R ; s, t)=\int_{0}^{1} m^{x}(1-m)^{1-x} \frac{1}{\beta(s, t-s)} m^{s-1}(1-m)^{t-s-1} d m \\
& =\left(\frac{s}{t}\right)^{x}\left(\frac{t-8}{t}\right)^{1-x} ; \\
& x=1 \text { when } R=R(1) \\
& x=0 \text { when } R=R(\underline{2}) \text {. } \tag{4.6}
\end{align*}
$$

where $s$ and $t$ are the parameters of the prior distribution indexed by $i, j$ and $k$. The expected value of $R$ is

$$
\begin{align*}
& E_{i, j}^{k}(R ; s, t)=\sum_{R} R e_{i, j}^{k}(R ; s, t)=R(1) \frac{s}{t}+R(2) \frac{t-8}{t}  \tag{4.7}\\
& \text { There are } I=N \sum_{i=1}^{N} K_{i} \text { prior distributions, and the parameters }
\end{align*}
$$

$s$ and $t$ must be specified for each distribution. The symbol $\psi$ denotes a $1 \times L$ vector containing the parameters of all prior distributions. The decision maker must estimate $s$ and $t$ for each of these distributions in the manner which best reflects any prior intelligence about the corresponding reward distribution. One point of view is that the ratio s/t should be selected to correspond with the decision maker's estimate of the expected value of $R$, and that the magnitude of $t$ will reflect his certainty of the estimate of the expected value. A large value of $t$ indicates a great deal of confidence in that estimate, while a small value
of $t$ would allow a more rapid relative change in the posterior parameters and indicate less confidence in the initial estimate of the expected value of $R_{\text {. }}$
B. The Expected Value of the Sum of Discounted Rewards

Equation (3.9) defined, in recursive form, the expected value of the sum of discounted rewards for the Markovian decision process with uncertain rewards. Using the reward likelihood (4.1), the prior distribution (4.4) and the notation of (4.6), the value of the Markovian decision process with uncertain Bernoulli rewards under the strategy $D(i, n)$ can now be written

$$
\begin{align*}
& w_{i}\left(D^{n}, \psi\right)=q^{k^{l}}{ }^{\frac{1}{b}}(\psi)+\beta \sum_{j=1}^{N} p_{i, j}^{\bar{b}_{0}^{l}} \sum_{R} \ell_{i, j}^{k^{l}} \bar{b}_{0}(R ; \psi) w_{j}\left(D^{n-1}, T_{i, j}^{\bar{b}_{0}^{l}}(R, \psi)\right), \\
& i=1,2, \ldots N, \quad R=R(1), R(2) \quad . \tag{4.8}
\end{align*}
$$

Analogously, equation (3.10) is now

$$
\begin{align*}
& v_{i}(n, \psi)= \max _{1 \leq k \leq K_{i}}\left\{q_{i}^{k}(\psi)\right. \\
&+B \sum_{j=1}^{N} p_{i, j}^{k} \sum_{R} \ell_{i, j}^{k}(R ; \psi) v_{j}\left(n-1, T_{i, j}^{k}(R, \psi)\right\} \\
&  \tag{4.9}\\
& i=1,2, \ldots N, \quad R=R(1), R(2) \quad .
\end{align*}
$$

For an infinite transition horizon, equation (4.9) will be written

$$
\left.\begin{array}{rl}
v_{i}(\psi) & =\max _{1 \leq k \leq K_{i}}\left\{q_{i}^{k}(\psi)+\beta \sum_{j=1}^{N} p_{i, j}^{k} \sum_{R} e_{i, j}^{k}(R ; \psi) v_{j}\left(T_{i, j}^{k}(R, \psi)\right)\right\} \\
1 & =1,2, \ldots N_{1} \quad R \tag{4.10}
\end{array}\right)
$$

The remainder of this thesis will focus on the properties and solution of equation (4.10).

> C. A Strategy for a Markovian Decision Process with Uncertain Bernoulli Rewards

A strategy for the decision process described in the previous section will now be deacribed. For an $n$ transition horizon, a sampling strategy will be constructed by first specifying a strategy for a transition horizon of one, amending that to obtain a strategy for a horizon of two and proceeding sequentially to the a transition horizon strategy. Since there are a finite number of states and rewards, the number of strategies will be finite if the transition horizon is finite.

If the system is in state $i$ and the alternative to govern the next transition has been chosen, the decision maker can select a policy vector which will specify the altemative to be chosen after the next transition, give the outcome of the next transition and the reward recelved due to that transition. Because there are $2 N$ possible outcomes of a transition and a reward, the policy vector ia a $1 \times 2 \mathrm{~N}$ vector denoted by

$$
\begin{equation*}
\sigma=\left(k_{1,1}, k_{1,2}, k_{2,1}, k_{2,2}, \ldots k_{N, 1}, k_{N, 2}\right) \tag{4.11}
\end{equation*}
$$

Element $k_{j, \ell}=1,2,3, \ldots K_{j}$ denotes the altemative to be chosen if the next transition is to state $f$ and the reward received due to the transition is $R=R(\ell), \ell=1,2$. Let $\sum$ be the finite set of the $J=\prod_{i=1}^{N} K_{i}^{2}$ policy vectors $\sigma$. Index the policy vectors by the integers 0 through $J=1$.

$$
\begin{equation*}
\sum=\left(\sigma_{0}, \sigma_{1}, \sigma_{2}, \ldots \sigma_{J-1}\right) \tag{4.12}
\end{equation*}
$$

Assume that the system is initially in state $1_{0}$ and that altemative $k, k=\left(1,2,3, \ldots k_{i_{0}}\right)$, has been chosen to govern the first transition. Before the first transition the decision maker can specify a policy vector $d(1)=\sigma_{\alpha_{1,1}}, \alpha_{1,1}=0,1,2, \ldots J-1$, which specifies the alternative to be chosen to govern the second transition. Let $D^{2}=D\left(2, i_{0}, k, d(1)\right)$, be called a strategy for a horizon of two transitions.

A strategy for a horizon of three transitions can be defined by stating $D^{2}$ and specifying the $2 N$ policy vectors which will dictate the altemative chosen to govern the third transition. There are 2 N possible state-reward histories leading from $i_{0}$ to the outcome of the first transition. These may be denoted by

$$
\begin{align*}
& x_{2}\left(1_{1}, \ell_{1}\right), \quad 1_{1}=1,2, \ldots N \\
& \ell_{1}=1,2, \tag{4.13}
\end{align*}
$$

where $i_{1}$ is the state of the system after the first transition and $\ell_{1}$
completes the description of the observed reward, Because $i_{0}$ and $I$ : are known, the reward received due to the first transition is known to have been a sample from the reward distribution indexed by $i_{0}, i_{1}$ and $k$. There must be a policy vector specified for each possible state-reward history. The following function of $x_{2}\left(i_{1}, \ell_{1}\right)$ is a 2 N -ary number which will be used to order the state-reward histories.

$$
\begin{align*}
& z\left(x_{2}\left(i_{1}, \ell_{1}\right)\right)=y\left(i_{1}, \ell_{1}\right)(2 N)^{-1}, \\
& y\left(i_{1}, \ell_{1}\right)=2\left(i_{1}-1\right)+\ell_{1}-1, \quad \begin{array}{l}
i=1,2,3, \ldots i \\
\ell=1,2 \ldots
\end{array}
\end{align*}
$$

Associated with each state-reward history is the unique number $z\left(x_{2}\left(i_{1}, Q_{1}\right)\right)$. Order the state-reward histories so that $x_{2}\left(i_{1}^{\prime}, l_{1}^{\prime}\right)<x_{2}\left(i_{1}^{\prime}, l_{1}^{\prime}\right)<$ $x_{2}\left(l_{1}^{\prime \prime}, l_{1}^{\prime \prime}\right)<\ldots$ when $z\left(x_{2}\left(i_{1}^{\prime}, l_{1}^{\prime}\right)\right)<z\left(x_{2}\left(i_{1}^{\prime}, l_{1}^{\prime \prime}\right)\right)<$ $z\left(x_{2}\left(i_{l}^{\prime \prime}, \varepsilon_{1}^{\prime \prime}\right)\right) \ldots$ and index the histories with the digits 1 through $2 N$, assigning the history associated with the smallest value of $z\left(x_{2}\left(i_{1}, l_{1}\right)\right)$ the integer 1 , the next smallest the integer 2 etc. . The state-reward histories from $i_{0}$ through the first transition may now be denoted $x_{2,1}, x_{2,2}, x_{2,3}, \ldots x_{2,2 N}$ where the first subscrint indicates a history through the first transition and the second subscript refers to the ordering index fust described. Denote the policy vector selccted by the decision maker when strategy $D^{2}$ is used and state revard history $x_{2, g}$ is nibserved by $\gamma\left(2, g, D^{2}\right)=\sigma_{\alpha_{2, R}}, \alpha_{2, \delta}=0,1,2, \ldots J-1$. Define the $1 \times 2 \mathrm{iv}$ vector $\gamma(2)=\left(\sigma_{\alpha_{2,1}}, \sigma_{\alpha_{2,2}}, \sigma_{\alpha_{2,3}}, \ldots \sigma_{\alpha_{2,2 i}}\right)$.

Lengthen this vector by attaching the element $d(1)$ to the front of $Y(2)$ and denote the result by

$$
\begin{equation*}
d(2)=\left(\sigma_{\alpha_{1,1}}, \sigma_{\alpha_{2,1}}, \sigma_{\alpha_{2,2}}, \ldots \sigma_{\alpha_{2,2 \mathrm{~N}}}\right) \tag{4.15}
\end{equation*}
$$

A strategy $D^{3}$ for a horizon of three transitions is

$$
\begin{equation*}
D^{3}=D\left(3, i_{0}, k, d(2)\right) \tag{4.16}
\end{equation*}
$$

The strategy $D^{3}$ explicitIy states the alternative to be chosen to govern the first, second and third transitions as a function of the observed transitions and rewards.

In general, to construct a strategy $D^{h}$ given $D^{h-1}$ it is necessary to specify $(2 N)^{\mathrm{h}-2}$ additional policy vectors since that is the number of possible state-reward histories $x_{h-i}\left(I_{1}, l_{1}, i_{2}, l_{2}, \ldots i_{h-2}, l_{h-2}\right)$ leading from $i_{0}$ through the (h-2) th transition. As before, the staterevard histories can be assigned a 2 N -ary number.

$$
\begin{align*}
z\left(x_{h-1}\left(i_{1}, \ell_{1}, i_{2}, \ell_{2}, \ldots i_{h-2}, l_{h-2}\right)\right) & =\sum_{m=1}^{h-2} y\left(i_{m}, \ell_{m}\right)(2 N)^{-m} ; \\
y\left(i_{m}, \ell_{m}\right)=2\left(i_{m}-1\right)+\ell_{m}-1, & i=1,2, \ldots N \\
\ell & =1,2 . \tag{4.17}
\end{align*}
$$

Order the histories as before, so that

$$
x_{h-1}\left(1_{1}^{\prime}, l_{1}^{\prime}, i_{2}^{\prime}, l_{2}^{\prime}, \ldots i_{h-2}^{\prime}, l_{h-2}^{e}\right)
$$

$$
\left\langle x_{h-1}\left(i_{1}^{\prime \prime}, \ell_{1}^{\prime \prime}, i_{2}^{\prime \prime}, \ell_{2}^{\prime \prime}, \ldots i_{h-2}^{\prime \prime}, \ell_{h-2}^{\prime \prime}\right)\right.
$$

when

$$
\begin{aligned}
& z\left(x_{h-1}\left(1_{1}^{\prime}, \ell_{1}^{\prime}, 1_{2}^{\prime}, \ell_{2}^{\prime}, \ldots i_{h-2}^{\prime}, l_{h-2}^{\prime}\right)\right) \\
& <z\left(x_{h-1}\left(i_{1}^{\prime}, \ell_{1}^{\prime}, 1_{2}^{\prime \prime}, \ell_{2}^{\prime \prime}, \ldots i_{h-2}^{\prime \prime}, \ell_{h-2}^{\prime \prime}\right)\right),
\end{aligned}
$$

and index the histories with the integers 1 through $(2 N)^{\text {h-2 }}$. The policy vector to be selected prior to the (h-1) th transition, when the history through the $(h-2)^{\text {th }}$ transition identified by the ordering index $g$ has been observed, is $\gamma\left(h-1, g, D^{h-1}\right)=\sigma_{\alpha_{h-1,8}}$. Let the $1 \times(2 \mathrm{~N})^{\mathrm{h}-2}$ vector $\gamma(\mathrm{h}-1)=\left(\sigma_{\alpha_{h-1,1}}, \sigma_{\alpha_{h-1,2}}, \cdots \sigma_{\alpha_{h-1,(2 N}}{ }^{h-2}\right)$ specify the policy vectors selected prior to the ( $h-1)^{\text {th }}$ transition and which in turn will dictate the altemative to be chosen to govem the $h^{\text {th }}$ transition. Combine $\gamma(h-1)$ and $d(h-2)$ to obtain $d(h-1)$.

$$
d(h-1)=\left(\sigma_{\alpha_{1,1}}, \sigma_{\alpha_{2,1}}, \sigma_{\alpha_{2,2}}, \cdots \sigma_{\alpha_{2,2 N}}, \sigma_{\alpha_{3,1}}, \ldots \sigma_{\alpha_{h-1,(2 N)}} h-2\right)
$$

The symbol $d(h-1)$ denotes a $1 \times M(h-1)$ vector where

$$
\begin{align*}
& M(0)=0 \\
& M(h)=\sum_{g=1}^{h}(2 N)^{g-1} ; h=1,2,3, \ldots \tag{4.19}
\end{align*}
$$

The $h$ transition horizon strategy is

$$
\begin{equation*}
D^{h}=D\left(h, 1_{0}, k, d(h-1)\right) \tag{4.20}
\end{equation*}
$$

Call $\Delta\left(i_{0}, n\right)$ the set of all $n$ transition strategies when the system is initially in state $i_{0}$. When $n$ is finite, the total number of unique strategies contained in the set $\Delta\left(i_{0}, a\right)$ is finite and equal $S=K_{I_{0}} J^{M(n)}$.
D. The Existence and Uniqueness of $v_{i}(\psi)$

Some results from Bayesian Decision Problems and Markov Chains by J. J. Martin (16) are very useful at this point. A model which Martin developed and the model of this chapter have certain similarities, and several of his theorems, with only slight modffications, apply to a Markovian decision process with uncertain Bernoulli rewards. In this spirit, four theorems based on Martin (16, p. 38-44) follow. The proofs given are from Martin but with the required changes.

Theorem 4.1. Let $w_{i}(D, \psi)$ be the expected value of the sum of discounted rewards when the system is in state 1 , strategy $D$ is used and the transition horizon is infinite. Let

$$
\begin{equation*}
\psi_{i}(\psi)=\sup _{\operatorname{DE\Delta (1)}}\left\{w_{i}(D, \psi)\right\} \tag{4.21}
\end{equation*}
$$

Then there is a strategy $D^{*} \varepsilon \Delta(1)$ such that

$$
\begin{equation*}
v_{1}(\psi)=w_{1}\left(D^{*}, \psi\right) \tag{4.22}
\end{equation*}
$$

Proof. First it will be shown that $v_{i}(\psi)$ is bounded. Denote the possible rewards from the distribution indexed by $i, j$ and $k$ by $R_{i, j}^{k}(\ell), \ell=1,2$. If $R^{*}=\max _{1, j, k, \ell}\left\{R_{i, j}^{k}(\ell)\right\}$, then the maximum value of the sum of discounted rewards which can be received is

$$
\begin{equation*}
\sum_{h=1}^{\infty} \beta^{h-1} R^{\star}=\frac{R^{k}}{1-\beta} \tag{4.23}
\end{equation*}
$$

Letting $\delta$ denote the set of all $d$ in the strategy $D=D(1, k, d)$, equation (4.21) can be written

$$
\begin{equation*}
v_{i}(\psi)=\max _{1 \leq k \leq K_{i}} \quad \sup _{d \varepsilon \delta}\left\{w_{i}(k, d, \psi)\right\} \tag{4.24}
\end{equation*}
$$

To each def let there correspond the J-ary number

$$
\begin{equation*}
a(d)=\sum_{h=1}^{\infty} \sum_{j=1}^{(2 N)^{h-1}} a_{h, j} J^{-(M(h-1)+j)} \tag{4.25}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $M(h)$ is defined in equation (4.19). For any de d: $0 \leq a(d) \leq I$, and in addition equation (4.25) is a one-tome mapping of the set $\delta$ onto the closed interval $[0,1]$. For fixed $i$ and $k$ let $g_{i}^{k}(a, \psi)$ be a function defined on $[0,1]$ by

$$
\begin{equation*}
g_{i}^{k}(a, \psi)=w_{i}(k, d, \psi) \tag{4.26}
\end{equation*}
$$

Then equation (4.24) can be written

$$
\begin{equation*}
v_{i}(\psi)=\max _{1 \leq k \leq x_{1}}^{\operatorname{mup}_{\leq a \leq 1}}\left\{\left\{_{i}^{k}(a, \psi)\right\}\right. \tag{4.27}
\end{equation*}
$$

To show that for fixed $k, \delta_{i}^{k}(a, \psi)$ is continuous in a let a

$$
R^{* *}=\max _{i, j, k, \ell}\left\{\left|R_{i, j}^{k}(\ell)\right|\right\}, r^{* \dot{x}}=\min _{i, j, k, \ell}\left\{\left|R_{i, j}^{k}(\ell)\right|\right\} \text {. (4.28) }
$$

For a given $\xi$ choose a positive integer $n$ such that

$$
\begin{equation*}
\beta^{n+1}\left(\frac{R^{* *-r * *}}{1-\beta}\right)<\xi \tag{4.29}
\end{equation*}
$$

For a fixed a $\varepsilon[0,1]$ let $a^{\prime}$ be any number such that $0 \leq a^{\prime} \leq 1$ and $\left|a-a^{\prime}\right|<J^{-\nu}$. If $a=a(d)$ and $a^{\prime}=a^{\prime}\left(d^{\prime}\right)$ then

$$
\begin{array}{ll}
\sigma_{\alpha, g}=\sigma_{\alpha_{h, g}}^{\prime}, & h=1,2, \ldots(v-1)  \tag{4.30}\\
g=1,2, \ldots(2 N)^{v-2} .
\end{array}
$$

Since both strategies are identical through the first $v$ transitions,

$$
\begin{align*}
\left|s_{i}^{k}(a, \psi)-8_{i}^{k}\left(a^{\prime}, \psi\right)\right| & \leq \sum_{h \sim v+1}^{\infty} \beta^{h-1}\left(R^{* *-r * *}\right) \\
& =\beta^{\nu}\left(\frac{R^{* *}-r^{* *}}{1-\beta}\right)<\xi \cdot \tag{4.31}
\end{align*}
$$

So $g_{1}^{k}(a, \psi)$ is a continuous function of $a$ on the compact set $[0,1]$ and for each $k$ there exists an $a_{k}^{k} \varepsilon[0,1]$ such that

$$
\begin{equation*}
\delta_{i}^{k}\left(a_{k}^{k}, \psi\right)=\sup _{0 \leq a \leq 1}\left\{\delta_{i}^{k}(a, \psi)\right\} \tag{4.32}
\end{equation*}
$$

Letting $d^{*}(k)$ denote the inverse image of $a_{k}^{*}=a_{k}^{\star}\left(d^{*}\right)$,

$$
\begin{equation*}
v_{i}(\psi)=\max _{1 \leq k \leq K_{1}}\left\{v_{i}\left(k, d^{*}(k), \psi\right)\right\} \tag{4.33}
\end{equation*}
$$

and there exists a strategy $D^{*}=D^{*}\left(i, k *, d^{*}(k *)\right)$ such that

$$
\begin{equation*}
v_{i}(\psi)=v_{i}\left(D^{*}, \psi\right) \quad-\quad \text { QED. } \tag{4.34}
\end{equation*}
$$

Theorem 4.2. If the set of functions $\left\{v_{i}(n, \psi)\right\}$ is defined by equation (4.9) then the limits

$$
\begin{equation*}
\lim _{n \rightarrow \infty} v_{i}(n, \psi)=v_{i}(\psi), \quad i=1,2, \ldots N \tag{4.35}
\end{equation*}
$$

exist and $\left\{v_{i}(\psi)\right\}$ is a set of solutions to equation (4.10).
Proof. It will be established inductively that for arbitrary positive integers $n$ and $m$,

$$
\begin{align*}
& \left|v_{i}(n, \psi)-v_{i}(m, \psi)\right| \leq \frac{\beta^{n}-\beta^{m}}{1-\beta} R * *, \\
& i=1,2, \ldots N, \quad n, m=0,1,2, \ldots, \tag{4.36}
\end{align*}
$$

where $R^{* *}=\max _{i, j, k, \ell}\left\{\mid R_{i, j}^{k}(\ell) \|\right.$. Because $0 \leq \beta<1$ it follows by the

Cauchy criterion that $\ell_{i m} v_{1}(n, \psi)$ exists for $i=1,2, \ldots$ N. By allowing $n$ to go to $\infty$ in equation (4.9), it follows that the limiting functions satisfy equation (4.10). Let

$$
\begin{equation*}
s_{i}^{k}(v, n, \psi)=q_{i}^{k}(\psi)+\sum_{j=1}^{N} p_{i, j}^{k} \sum_{R} e_{i, j}^{k}(R ; \psi) v_{j}\left(n, T_{i, j}^{k}(R ; \psi)\right) \tag{4.37}
\end{equation*}
$$

To establish equation (4.32) let

$$
\begin{aligned}
& v_{i}(n, \psi)=s_{i}^{\alpha}(v, n-1, \psi)=\max _{1 \leq k \leq K_{i}}\left\{S_{i}^{k}(v, n-1, \psi)\right\}, \\
& v_{i}(m, \psi)=s_{i}^{\delta}(v, \mathbb{m}-1, \psi)=\max _{1 \leq k \leq K_{i}}\left\{S_{i}^{k}(v, m-1, \psi)\right\},
\end{aligned}
$$

then

$$
\begin{align*}
& v_{i}(n, \psi)-v_{i}\left(m_{i}, \psi\right) \leq s_{i}^{\alpha}(v, n-1, \psi)-s_{i}^{\alpha}(v, m-1, \psi), \\
& v_{i}(n, \psi)-v_{i}(m, \psi) \geq s_{i}^{\delta}(v, n-1, \psi)-s_{i}^{\delta}(v, n-1, \psi) \quad . \tag{4.38}
\end{align*}
$$

Let $k *$ index the larger of $\left|S_{i}^{\alpha}(v, n-1, \psi)-S_{i}^{\alpha}(v, \pi-1, \psi)\right|$ and $\left|s_{i}^{\delta}(v, n-1, \psi)-s_{i}^{\delta}(v, m-1, \psi)\right|$. Then

$$
\begin{aligned}
\left|v_{i}(n, \psi)-v_{i}(m, \psi)\right| & \leq\left|s_{i}^{k *}(v, n-1, \psi)-s_{i}^{k *}(v, m-1, \psi)\right| \\
& \leq \beta \sum_{j=1}^{N} P_{i, j}^{k *} \sum_{R} e_{i, j}^{k *}(R ; \psi) \mid v_{j}\left(n-1, T_{i, j}^{k^{*}}(R ; \psi)\right.
\end{aligned}
$$

$$
\begin{aligned}
& -v_{j}\left(m-1, T_{i, j}^{k *}(k, \psi)\right) \mid \\
& i=1,2, \ldots N, \quad n, m=0,1,2, \ldots \quad \text { (4.39) }
\end{aligned}
$$

Assuming that $v_{i}(0, \psi)=0, i=1,2, \ldots=N$, then

$$
\begin{equation*}
\left|v_{1}(n, \psi)\right| \leq \sum_{h=1}^{n} \beta^{h-1} R * *=\frac{1-\beta^{n}}{1-\beta} R * * \tag{4.40}
\end{equation*}
$$

Therefore, assuming that $n \geq m$,

$$
\begin{equation*}
\left|v_{i}(n-m, \psi)\right| \leq \frac{1-\beta^{n-m}}{1-\beta} R \star * \tag{4.41}
\end{equation*}
$$

An inductive argument using equations (4.39) and (4.41) shows that

$$
\begin{equation*}
\left|v_{i}(n, \psi)-v_{i}(m, \psi)\right| \leq \frac{\beta^{m}-\beta^{n}}{1-\beta} R^{* *} . \tag{4.42}
\end{equation*}
$$

and a similar argument for the case $m>n$ gields equation (4.36). Q.E.D. Proofs of the remaining theorems in this section will not be given. Modifications of the proofs to Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 are typical of those necessary for the remaining theorems, and the required proofs follow almost directly from Martin.

Theorem 4.3. There exists a unique set of functions $v_{i}(\psi)$ which satisfies the set of equations

$$
\begin{align*}
v_{i}(\psi) & =\max _{1 \leq k \leq K_{i}}\left\{q_{i}^{k}(\psi)+: \sum_{j=1}^{N} p_{i, j}^{k} \sum_{R} q_{i, j}^{k}(k ; \psi) v_{j}\left(T_{i, j}^{k}(k ;(\cdot))\right\}\right. \\
i & =1,2, \ldots N, \quad R=R(1), R(2) . \tag{4.43}
\end{align*}
$$

Theorem 4.4. If $\left\{v_{i}(\dot{\psi})\right\}$ is the unique bounded set of functions which satisfy equation (4.10) and if $e_{i, j}^{k}(R ; \psi)$ is a continuous function of $\psi\left(k=1,2, \ldots K_{i} ; i, j=1,2, \ldots N\right)$, then $v_{i}(\psi)$ is a continuous function of $\psi(i=1,2, \ldots N)$.

It has now been shown that the set of solutions $\left\{v_{1}(\psi)\right\}$ to equation (4.10) exist and are unique, and that there is an optimal strategy $D^{*}$ which will achieve $\left\{v_{i}(\psi)\right\}$. The decision maker would like a method of determining, or at least approximating, the set of solutions $\left\{v_{i}(\psi)\right\}$. A more immediate problem facing the decision maker is the choice of the alternative to govern the next transition. Before proceeding to Chapter V and a discussion of these problems, three additional theorems from Bayesian Decision Problems and Markov Chains (16, p. 44-50), but modified to apply to the model of this chapter, will be stated.

Martin has developed a bound for the error function $|e(n, \psi)|$ $=\left|v_{i}(\psi)-v_{i}(n, \psi)\right|$. The bound converges monotonically to zero, and $n$ can be chosen such that the resulting error bound is small enough to make $v_{i}(n, \psi)$ a satisfactory approximation to $v_{i}(\psi)$. The following theorems concern this bound.

Theorem 4.5. The value $v_{i}(\psi)$ has the bounds

$$
\begin{equation*}
\frac{r^{*}}{1-\beta} \leq v_{i}(\psi) \leq \frac{R^{*}}{1-\beta} \tag{4.44}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $r^{*}=\max _{i, j, k, \ell}\left\{R_{i, j}^{k}(\ell)\right\}$ and $r^{*}=\min _{i, j, k, \ell}\left\{R_{i, j}^{k}(\ell)\right\}$. Theorem 4.6. Let $v_{i}(n, \psi)$, as defined in equation (4.9), be a sequence of successive approximations. Then the error term of the $n^{\text {th }}$ approximation has the bound

$$
\begin{equation*}
|e(n, \psi)| \leq \beta^{n}\left(\max \left\{\frac{R^{*}}{1-\beta} ; \frac{-r^{*}}{1-\beta}\right\}\right) \tag{4.45}
\end{equation*}
$$

Theorem 4.7. Let the generalized state $(1 ; \psi)$ be fixed and let $\lambda(1, \psi) \varepsilon \Delta(1)$ denote the set of optimal strategies for the Markovian decision process of equation (4.10). If $D *(i, n)$ is an optimal strategy for the problem defined by equation (4.9) then, as $n \rightarrow \infty, D *(1, n)$ ultimately lies in $\lambda(i, \psi)$.

## V. CiLCULATION OF THE SLT OF SOLUTIONS $\left\{\mathbf{v}_{\mathbf{i}}(\psi)\right\}$

TO THE MARKOVIAN DECISION PROCESS WITH UNCERTAIN BERNOLLLI REHARDS

Theorem 4.5 provides a bound for the error term $|e(n, \psi)|=$ $\left|v_{i}(\psi)-v_{i}(n, \psi)\right|$ which is a monotonically decreasing function of $n$. The value $v_{i}(\psi)$ of equation $(4.10)$ can be approximated by calculating $v_{i}(n, \psi)$ of equation (4.9), with $n$ chosen large enough to reduce the bound of the error term to a magnitude acceptable to the decision maker. The practicality of this method of solution is seriously limited because of the excessive time required to calculate $v_{i}(n, \Psi)$. Consider the simple " $2 \times 2$ " problem in which the system consists of two states ( $N=2$ ), and there are two altematives available in each state $\left(\mathbb{K}_{i}=2,1=1,2\right)$. For fixed $k$ the equation describing $v_{i}(n, \psi)$ contains four different values of $v_{j}\left(n-1, T_{i, j}^{k}(R, \psi)\right)$ and since $k=(1,2)$, there are a total of eight values of $v_{j}\left(n-1, T_{i, j}^{k}(k, \psi)\right)$ which must be calculated. Each of these in turn generates eight additional values until $v_{j}\left(I, T_{i, j}^{k}(R, \psi)\right)$, which requires only two calculations, is reached. Solution of $v_{1}(n, \psi)$ for the " $2 \times 2$ " case therefore requires $8^{n-1} \cdot 2$ separate calculations.

The bound of $|e(n, \psi)|$ is a function of the discount factor, $B$. If $B$ is the present worth factor for a compounding period of one, then $\beta=1 /(1+i)$ where $i$ is the effective rate of interest. A typical rate of interest might be $10 \%$ per year, so that $B \simeq 0.9$. Should the time interval between transitions be less than one year, $\beta$ will be greater than 0.9 if the annual rate of interest of $10 \%$ is to be maintained. Assuming $B=0.9$ to be typical, then $\beta^{n}$ converges rather slowly. For example, ten iterations would reduce the initial error bound by a factor
of approximately 0.35, while the number of separate calculations for the " $2 \times 2$ " case necessary to calculate $v_{1}(10, \psi)$ would be approximately $2.7 \times 10^{8}$. These considerations may create some concem about the practicability of applying the Markovian decision process with uncertain Bernoulli rewards to a real world problem unless a better method of solution can be developed. The purpose of this chapter is to develop bounds for $v_{i}(\psi)$ which are relatively quick to calculate, and to develop a method of determining the altemative which, for a fixed $\psi$, should be chosen to govern the next transition.

The Markovian decision process with uncertain Bemoulli rewards is conceptually similar to the discounted model discussed by Howard (12, p. 76-91), except that Howard assumed the rewards to be known constants. Let

$$
\begin{align*}
A_{i, j}^{k}= & \text { the reward received due to transition from state } i \\
& \text { to state } j \text { when alternative } k \text { is chosen to govern } \\
& \text { the transition. } \\
A= & a \quad 1 \times i \text { vector containing the rewards } A_{i, j}^{k} \text { for all } \\
& i, j \text { and } k . \tag{5.1}
\end{align*}
$$

When the state transition horizon is infinite and the system is in state 1 , Howard has defined $u_{i}(\psi)$ as the expected value of the sum of future discounted rewards under an optimal strategy, where

$$
\begin{align*}
u_{i}(A)= & \max _{1 \leq k \leq K_{i}}\left\{\sum_{j=1}^{N} p_{i, j}^{k} A_{i, j}^{k}+\beta \sum_{j=1}^{N} p_{i, j}^{k} u_{j}(A)\right\} \\
& 1=1,2, \ldots N \tag{5.2}
\end{align*}
$$

and has shown that the set of solutions $\left\{u_{i}(A)\right\}$ exist. in important contribution by Howard ( 12, p. 76-87) was the development of the value determination operation and the policy improvement routine, which together form an iterative method of calculating the set of solutions $\left\{u_{i}(A)\right\}$ to equation (5.2). From equation (5.2) it is clear that the altemative to be chosen to govern the next transition depends only on $i$, the current state of the system. Denote the state stationary strategy which yields $\left\{u_{i}(A)\right\}$ by $\Omega(A)=\left(\omega_{1}, \omega_{2}, \ldots \omega_{N}\right)$, where $\omega_{i}$ is the alternative to be chosen when the system is in state $i$. With reference to section $C$ of Chapter IV, the decision maker always chooses the same policy vector and ignores past history.

Consider another similar Markovian decision process; suppose that the rewards are random variables whose distributions are known. Let

$$
\begin{align*}
f_{i, j}^{k}(0 ; \lambda)= & \text { the density function of the reward received } \\
& \text { due to transition from state } i \text { to state } j \\
& \text { when alternative } k \text { s chosen to govern the } \\
& \text { transition. } \\
\Lambda= & a \quad 1 \times L \text { vector containing the parameters of } \\
& f_{i, j}^{k}(. ; \lambda) \text { for all } i, j \text { and } k . \tag{5.3}
\end{align*}
$$

Then the following equation, which is analogous to equations (4.10) and (5.2), can be written

$$
x_{i}(\Lambda)=\max _{1 \leq k \leq K_{i}}\left\{\sum_{j=1}^{N} p_{i, 1}^{k} \int_{R} R f_{i, f}^{k}(R ; \lambda) d R\right.
$$

$$
\begin{align*}
& \left.+B \sum_{j=1}^{N} P_{i, j}^{k} \int_{R} f_{i, j}^{k}(R ; \lambda) x_{j}(\Lambda) d R\right\}, \\
& i=1,2, \ldots N . \tag{5.4}
\end{align*}
$$

Denote the expected value of a reward by

$$
E_{i, j}^{k}(R)=\int_{R} R f_{i, j}^{k}(R ; \lambda) d R
$$

and let

$$
\begin{align*}
E\left(R_{\Lambda}\right)= & a \quad 1 \times L \text { vector containing the expected values } \\
& E_{i, j}^{k}(R) \text { for all } i, j \text { and } k . \tag{5.5}
\end{align*}
$$

It will be shown that the set of solutions $\left\{x_{i}(\Lambda)\right\}=\left\{u_{i}\left(E\left(R_{\Lambda}\right)\right)\right\}$. Since $x_{i}(\Lambda)$ is a constant, equation (5.4) can be written

$$
\begin{align*}
x_{i}(\Lambda)= & \max _{1 \leq k \leq K_{i}}\left\{\sum_{j=1}^{N} p_{i, j}^{k} \int_{R} R f_{i, j}^{k}(R ; \lambda) d R\right. \\
& \left.+B \sum_{j=1}^{N} p_{i, j}^{k} x_{j}(\Lambda) \int_{R} f_{i, j}^{k}(R ; \lambda) d R\right\} \\
= & \max _{1 \leq k \leq K_{i}}\left\{\sum_{j=1}^{N} p_{i, j}^{k} E_{i, j}^{k}(R)+\beta \sum_{j=1}^{N} p_{i, j}^{k} x_{j}(\Lambda)\right\} \\
& 1=1,2, \ldots N . \tag{5.6}
\end{align*}
$$

Substitute $E_{i, j}^{k}(R)$ for $A_{i, j}^{k}$ in equation (5.2). Then $u_{i}\left(E\left(R_{A}\right)\right)$ of equation (5.2) is of the same functional form as $x_{i}(\Lambda)$ of equation (5.6) so that $u_{i}\left(E\left(R_{\Lambda}\right)\right)=x_{i}(\Lambda), i=1,2, \ldots N$. Therefore the Markovian decision model described by (5.3) and equation (5.4) is equivalent to the discounted model discussed by Howard.

The preceding discussion leads to a method of obtaining a lower bound for $v_{i}(\psi)$ which, in most situations, will be much larger than the lower bound given in Theorem 4.5. The expected value $E_{i, j}^{k}(R ; \psi)$ was defined in equation (4.7). Let

$$
\begin{equation*}
E(R ; \psi)=a \quad 1 \times L \text { vector containing the values } E_{i, j}^{k}(R ; \psi) \tag{5.7}
\end{equation*}
$$ for all $1, j$ and $k$.

The state stationary strategy $\Omega(E(R ; \psi))$ is the optimal strategy associated with the set of solutions $\left\{u_{i}(E(R ; \psi))\right\}$ to equation (5.2).

Theorem 5.1. The value of a Markovian decision process with uncertain Bernouili rewards, given that the state trancition horizen is infinite and that the state stationary strategy $\Omega(E(R ; \psi))$ is used, is, from equation (4.8)

$$
\begin{align*}
w_{i}(\Omega(E(R ; \psi)), \psi)= & q_{i}^{\omega_{i}}+\beta \sum_{j=1}^{N} p_{1, j}^{\omega_{i}} \sum_{R} \ell_{i, j}^{\omega_{i}}(R ; \psi) \\
& \times w_{j}\left(\Omega(E(R ; \psi)), T_{i, j}^{\omega_{i}}(R, \psi)\right), \\
& 1=1,2, \ldots N, R=R(1), R(2), \tag{5.8}
\end{align*}
$$

If $u_{i}\left(E(R ; \psi)\right.$ ) is the solution to equation (5.2), then $w_{i}(\Omega(E(R ; \dot{\psi}))$ )
$=u_{i}(E(R ; \psi)), i=1,2, \ldots N$.

Proof. To simplify notation let $\Omega(E(R ; \psi))=\left(\omega_{1}, \omega_{2}, \ldots \omega_{N}\right)=(\omega)$. It will be established inductively that

$$
\begin{align*}
&\left.\omega_{i_{0}}(\Omega(R ; \psi)), \psi\right)= \sum_{i_{1}=1}^{N} p_{i_{0}, i_{1}}^{\omega} E_{i_{0}, i_{1}}^{\omega}\left(R_{1} ; \psi\right) \\
&+\beta \sum_{i_{1}=1}^{N} p_{i_{0}, i_{1}}^{\omega}\left[\sum_{i_{2}=1}^{N} p_{i_{1}, i_{2}}^{\omega} E_{i_{1}, i_{2}}^{\omega}\left(R_{2} ; \psi\right)\right. \\
&+\beta \sum_{i_{2}=1}^{N} p_{i_{1}, i_{2}}^{\omega}\left[\sum_{i_{3}=1}^{N} p_{i_{2}, i_{3}}^{\omega} E_{i_{2}, i_{3}}^{\omega}\left(R_{3} ; \psi\right)\right. \\
&+\ldots \\
&  \tag{5.9}\\
& i_{0}=1,2, \ldots N .
\end{align*}
$$

By letting $E_{i, j}^{\omega}(R ; \psi)=A_{i, j}^{\omega}$ it is clear from equation (5.9) that $w_{i}(\Omega(E(R ; \psi)), \psi)=u_{i}(E(R ; \psi))$.

Let $\Omega^{n}(E(R ; \psi))$ denote a $n$ state transition horizon even though the state stationary strategy is independent of the number of transitions. Then equation (4.8) can be used to establish equation (5.9).

$$
\begin{align*}
& w_{i_{0}}\left(\Omega^{1}(E(R ; \psi)), \psi\right)=\sum_{i_{1}=1}^{N} P_{i_{0}, i_{1}}^{k} \sum_{R_{1}} R_{1} e_{i_{0}, I_{1}}^{\omega}\left(R_{1} ; \psi\right) \\
& =\sum_{i_{1}=1}^{N} P_{i_{0}, i_{1}}^{\omega} E_{i_{0}, i_{1}}^{\omega}(R ; \psi) ; \\
& w_{i_{0}}\left(\Omega^{2}\left(E\left(R_{;} \psi\right)\right), \psi\right)=\sum_{i_{1}=1}^{N} p_{i_{0}, I_{1}}^{\omega} \sum_{R_{1}} R_{1} e_{i_{0}, i_{1}}^{\omega}\left(R_{1} ; \psi\right) \\
& +\beta \sum_{i_{1}=1}^{N} p_{i_{0}, i_{1}}^{\omega} \sum_{R_{1}} \varepsilon_{i_{0}, i_{1}}^{\omega}\left(R_{1} ; \psi\right)\left[\sum_{i_{2}=1}^{N} p_{i_{1}, i_{2}}^{\omega}\right. \\
& \left.\times E_{i_{1}, i_{2}}^{\omega}\left(R_{2} ; T_{i_{0}, i_{1}}^{\omega}\left(R_{1}, \psi\right)\right)\right] \quad . \tag{5.10}
\end{align*}
$$

It is necessary to show that

$$
\begin{align*}
\sum_{R_{1}} e_{i, j}^{\omega}\left(R_{1} ; \psi\right) & {\left[\sum_{h=1}^{N} p_{j, h}^{\omega} E_{j, h}^{\omega}\left(R_{2} ; T_{i, j}^{\omega}\left(R_{1}, \psi\right)\right)\right] } \\
& =\sum_{h=1}^{N} p_{j, h}^{\omega} E_{j, h}^{\omega}\left(R_{2} ; \psi\right) \tag{5.11}
\end{align*}
$$

Equation (5.11) cam be written

$$
\sum_{R_{1}} e_{i, j}^{\omega}\left(R_{1} ; \psi\right)\left[\sum_{h=1}^{N} p_{j, h}^{\omega} \sum_{R_{2}} \int_{m} R_{2} e_{j, h}^{\omega}\left(R_{2} / m\right) \phi_{j, h}^{\omega}\left(m / R_{1} ; \psi\right) d m\right]
$$

where $\phi_{j, h}^{\omega}\left(m / R_{1} ; \psi\right)$ is the posterior distribution of $m$ given $R_{1}$ and is determined by the application of Bayes theorem as shown in equation (4.5). As mentioned in the discussion following equation (2.24), the posterior distribution of $m$ differs from the prior distribution only when the reward observed is sampled from the distribution with indices identical to those of the prior distribution of $m$. if $i \neq j$ then $\phi_{j, h}^{\omega}\left(m / R_{1} ; \psi\right)=\phi_{j, h}^{\omega}(m ; \psi)$ since the likelihood of $R_{1}$ is $\ell_{i, j}^{\omega}(R ; \psi)$. When $1 \not \& j$ equation (5.12) can be written

$$
\begin{align*}
\sum_{R_{1}} e_{i, j}^{\omega}\left(R_{1} ; \psi\right) & {\left[\sum_{h=1}^{N} p_{j, h}^{\omega} \sum_{R_{2}} \int_{m} R e_{j, h}^{\omega}\left(R_{2} / m\right) \phi_{j, h}^{\omega}(m ; \psi) d m\right.} \\
& =\sum_{R_{1}} e_{1, j}^{\omega}\left(R_{1} ; \psi\right)\left[\sum_{h=1}^{N} p_{j, h}^{\omega} E_{j, h}^{\omega}\left(R_{2} ; \psi\right)\right] \\
& =\sum_{h=1}^{N} p_{j, h}^{\omega} E_{j, h}^{\omega}(R ; \psi) \tag{5.13}
\end{align*}
$$

For the case $i=j$ and $h \neq j$ the preceding argument is valid, and when $i=j=h$, that element of equation (5.12) is

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \sum_{R_{1}} \varepsilon_{i, i}^{\omega}\left(R_{1} ; \psi\right) p_{i, i}^{\omega} \sum_{R_{2}} \int e_{i}^{\omega}\left(R_{2} / m\right) \phi_{i, i}^{\omega}\left(m / R_{1}\right) d m \\
& \\
& =p_{i, i}^{\omega}\left[\frac{s}{t}\left[R_{2}(1) \frac{s+1}{t+1}+R_{2}(2) \frac{t-s}{t+1}\right]\right.
\end{aligned}
$$

$$
\begin{align*}
& \left.+\frac{t-s}{t}\left[R_{2}(1) \frac{B}{t+1}+R_{2}(2) \frac{t+1-8}{t+1}\right]\right] \\
& =P_{i, i}^{\omega}\left[\frac{s}{t} R_{2}(1)+\frac{t-8}{t} R_{2}(2)\right]=p_{i, i}^{\omega} E_{i, i}^{\omega}(R ; \psi) \tag{5.14}
\end{align*}
$$

Using the results of equations (5.13) and (5.14), the second equation of (5.10) can be written

$$
\begin{aligned}
& w_{i_{0}}\left(\Omega^{2}(E(R ; \psi)), \psi\right)=\sum_{i_{1}=1}^{N} p_{i_{0}, 1_{1}}^{\omega} \cdot E_{i_{0}, i_{1}}^{\omega}\left(R_{1} ; \psi\right) \\
& +\beta \sum_{1_{1}=1}^{N} P_{1_{0}, 1_{1}}^{\omega}\left[\sum_{1_{1}=1}^{N} p_{1_{1}, 1_{2}}^{\omega} E_{i_{1}, 1_{2}}^{\omega}\left(R_{2} ; \psi\right)\right] ; \\
& w_{i_{0}}\left(\Omega^{3}(E(R ; \psi)), \psi\right)=\sum_{i_{1}=1}^{N} p_{i_{0}, i_{1}}^{\omega} E_{i_{0}, i_{1}}^{\omega}\left(R_{1} ; \psi\right) \\
& +\beta \sum_{i_{1}=1}^{N} p_{i_{0}, i_{1}}^{\omega} \sum_{R_{1}} i_{i_{0}, i_{1}}^{\omega}\left(R_{1} ; \psi\right)\left[\sum_{i_{1}=1}^{N} p_{i_{1}, i_{2}}^{\omega}\right. \\
& \times E_{I_{1}, I_{2}}^{\omega}\left(R_{2} ; I_{i_{0}, I_{1}}^{\omega}\left(R_{1}, \psi\right)\right) \\
& +B \sum_{i_{2}=1}^{N} p_{I_{1}, I_{2}}^{\omega} \sum_{R_{2}} l_{I_{1}, i_{2}}^{\omega}\left(R_{2} ; T_{i_{0}, I_{1}}^{\omega}\left(R_{1}, \psi\right)\right)
\end{aligned}
$$

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \left.\times\left[\sum_{i_{j}=1}^{N} p_{i_{2}, I_{3}}^{\omega} E_{i_{2}, i_{3}}^{\omega}\left(R_{3} ; T_{i_{1}, i_{2}}^{\omega}\left(R_{2}, T_{i_{0}, i_{1}}^{\omega}\left(R_{1}, \psi\right)\right)\right)\right]\right] \\
& =\sum_{i_{1}=1}^{N} p_{i_{0}, I_{1}}^{\omega} E_{i_{0}, 1_{1}}^{\omega}\left(R_{1} ; \psi\right) \\
& +B \sum_{i_{1}=1}^{N} p_{i_{0}, i_{1}}^{\omega}\left[\sum_{i_{2}=1}^{N} p_{i_{1}, i_{2}}^{\omega} E_{i_{1}, i_{2}}^{\omega}\left(R_{2} ; \psi\right)\right. \\
& +S \sum_{R_{1}} \ell_{i_{0}, i_{1}}\left(R_{1} ; \psi\right) \sum_{i_{2}=1}^{N} p_{i_{1}, i_{2}}^{\omega}\left[\sum_{i_{3}=1}^{N} p_{i_{2}, i_{3}}^{\omega}\right. \\
& \left.\left.\times E_{i_{2}, i_{3}}^{\omega}\left(R_{3} ; I_{i_{0}, I_{1}}^{\omega}\left(R_{1}, \psi\right)\right)\right]\right] \\
& =\sum_{i_{1}=1}^{N} p_{1_{0}, i_{1}}^{\omega} E_{i_{0}, i_{1}}^{\omega}\left(R_{1} ; \psi\right) \\
& +\beta \sum_{i_{1}=1}^{N} p_{i_{0}, i_{1}}^{\omega}\left[\sum_{i_{2}=1}^{N} p_{i_{1}, i_{2}}^{\omega} E_{i_{1}, i_{2}}^{\omega}\left(R_{2} ; \psi\right)\right. \\
& \left.+\beta \sum_{i_{2}=1}^{N} p_{i_{1}, i_{2}}^{\omega}\left[\sum_{i_{3}=1}^{N} P_{i_{2}, i_{3}}^{\omega} E_{i_{2}, i_{3}}^{\omega}\left(R_{3} ; \psi\right)\right]\right] \text {. (5.15) }
\end{aligned}
$$

equation (5.9) for the infinite state transition case. Q.E.D. A theorem conceming the lower bound of $v_{i}(\psi)$ is now stated.

Theorem 5.2. Let $u_{i}(E(R ; \psi))$ be the solution to equation (5.2). Then $v_{i}(\psi)$, the solution to equation $(4.10)$, has the lower bound

$$
\begin{align*}
& u_{i}(E(R ; \psi)) \leq v_{1}(\psi) \\
& i=1,2, \ldots N \tag{5.16}
\end{align*}
$$

Proof. It was shown in Theorem 5.1 that $u_{i}(E(R ; \psi))=w_{i}(\Omega(E(R ; \psi), \psi)$; by equation (2.18) $v_{i}(\psi) \geq w_{i}(\Omega(E(R ; \psi), \psi)$ since $\Omega(E(R ; \psi)\rangle \varepsilon \Delta(i)$. Therefore $v_{i}(\psi) \geq W_{1}\left(\Omega(E(R ; \psi), \psi)=u_{i}(E(R ; \psi))\right.$. Q.E.D.

Both the values $v_{i}(\psi)$ and $v_{i}\left(T_{i, j}^{k}(R, \psi)\right)$ appear in the recursive equation (4.10). Before developing an upper bound of $v_{i}(\psi)$ it is necessary to obtain bounds for $v_{1}(\psi)-v_{i}\left(T_{1, j}^{k}(R, \psi)\right)$.

Theorem 5.3. If $T_{i{ }_{8}, f *}^{k *}(R(l, *), \psi)=\psi^{\prime}$ is such that

$$
\begin{equation*}
E_{i *, j *}^{k *}(R ; \psi)>E_{i *, j *}^{k *}\left(R ; \psi^{\prime}\right) \tag{5.17}
\end{equation*}
$$

and if $R(1)$ and $R(2)$ are the possible rewards from the distribution indexed by i*, $f^{*}$ and $k *$ then

$$
\begin{align*}
& 0 \leq v_{i \star}(\psi)-v_{i *}\left(\psi^{*}\right)<p_{i \star, j *}^{k *} \frac{|\lambda(1)-R(2)|}{1-\beta}, \\
& i *=1,2, \ldots N \quad, \tag{5.18}
\end{align*}
$$

where $v_{i}(\psi)$ is defined in equation (4.10).

Proof. Without loss of generality assume that $i^{*}=1, i^{*}=1$ and $\ell *=2$. The $1 \times \mathrm{L}$ vectors $\psi$ and $\psi^{\prime}$ differ only with respect to the parameters of the prior distribution indexed by 1,1 and $k *$ so that

$$
\begin{align*}
E_{i, j}^{k}(R ; \psi)= & E_{i, j}^{k}\left(R ; \psi^{\prime}\right), \ell_{i, j}^{k}(R ; \psi)=e_{i, j}^{k}\left(R ; \psi^{\prime}\right), \\
& \text { all i,j and } k \neq 1, j \text { and } k^{*}, \tag{5.19}
\end{align*}
$$

and

$$
\begin{equation*}
e_{1,1}^{k^{*}}(R(1) ; \psi)>e_{1,1}^{k *}\left(R(1) ; \psi^{\prime}\right) \tag{5.20}
\end{equation*}
$$

Under the initial assumptions of the proof, the inequalities (5.17) and (5.20) imply that $R(1)>R(2)$ for the distribution indexed by 1,1 and k*. From equations (3.7) and (4.7)

$$
\begin{aligned}
q_{1}^{k^{*}}(\psi)-q_{1}^{k^{*}}\left(\psi^{\prime}\right) & =\sum_{j=1}^{N} P_{1, j}^{k *}\left(E_{1, j}^{k *}(R ; \psi)-E_{1, j}^{k^{*}}\left(R ; \psi^{\prime}\right)\right) \\
& =P_{1,1}^{k^{*}}\left(E_{1,1}^{k^{*}}(R ; \psi)-E_{1,1}^{k^{*}}\left(R ; \psi^{\prime}\right)\right)>0 ; \\
q_{1}^{k^{*}}(\psi)-q_{1}^{k^{*}}\left(\psi^{\top}\right) & <P_{1,1}^{k^{*}}\left(\max _{\psi \varepsilon^{\Psi}}\left\{E_{1, j}^{k^{*}}(R ; \psi)\right\}-\min _{\psi \varepsilon^{\psi}}\left\{E_{1, j}^{k^{*}}(R ; \psi)\right\}\right) \\
& =P_{1,1}^{k *}|R(1)-R(2)|=\Delta_{1,1}^{k^{*}} q ;
\end{aligned}
$$

and

$$
\begin{align*}
& \mathrm{q}_{1}^{\mathrm{k}}(\psi)-\mathrm{q}_{1}^{\mathrm{k}}\left(\psi^{\prime}\right)=0, \quad \text { all } k \neq k^{k}, \\
& \mathrm{q}_{i}^{k}(\psi)-\mathrm{q}_{i}^{k}\left(\psi^{\prime}\right)=0, \quad \text { all } i \neq i^{*} . \tag{5.21}
\end{align*}
$$

Let

$$
\begin{align*}
S_{i}^{k}\left(n, \psi_{\star}\right)= & q_{i}^{k}\left(\psi_{\star}\right)+B \sum_{j=1}^{N} p_{i, j}^{k} \sum_{R} e_{i, j}^{k}\left(R ; \psi_{\star}\right) \\
& \times v_{j}\left(n, T_{i, j}^{k}\left(R, \psi_{\star}\right)\right), \\
& 1=1,2, \ldots N_{,}: R=R(1), R(2), \quad \psi_{\star}=\psi_{1} \psi^{\prime}, \tag{5.22}
\end{align*}
$$

and use the following notation,

$$
\begin{align*}
& v_{i}(n, \psi)=\max _{1 \leq k \leq k_{i}}\left\{S_{i}^{k}(n-1, \psi)\right\}=S_{i}^{k_{1}}(n-1, \psi), \\
& v_{i}\left(n, \psi^{\prime}\right)=\max _{1 \leq k \leq k_{i}}\left\{S_{i}^{k}\left(n-1, \psi^{\prime}\right)\right\}=S_{i}^{k}\left(n-1, \psi^{\prime}\right), \tag{5.23}
\end{align*}
$$

where $v_{i}(n, \psi)$ is defined in equation (4.9). The following inequality is developed using the above notation.

$$
\begin{align*}
v_{i}(n, \psi)-v_{i}\left(n, \psi^{\prime}\right) & =S_{i}^{k_{1}}(n-1, \psi)-s_{i}^{k_{2}}\left(n-1, \psi^{\prime}\right) \\
& \leq S_{i}^{k_{1}}(n-1, \psi)-s_{i}^{k_{1}}\left(n-1, \psi^{\prime}\right) . \tag{5.24}
\end{align*}
$$

The inequality (5.18) will be established inductively, when $n=1$ and assuming $k_{1}=k^{*}$,

$$
s_{1}^{k *}(0, \psi)-s_{1}^{k^{*}}\left(0, \psi^{\prime}\right)=q_{1}^{k^{*}}(\psi)-q_{1}^{k^{*}}\left(\psi^{\prime}\right)<\Delta_{1,1}^{k^{*}} q \quad \text { (5.25) }
$$

Next assume $k_{1} \neq k *$,

$$
\begin{align*}
s_{1}^{k_{1}}(0, \psi)-s_{1}^{k_{1}}(0, \psi) & =q_{1}^{k_{1}}(\psi)-q_{1}^{k_{1}}(\psi) \\
& =0 ; \tag{5.26}
\end{align*}
$$

from equations (5.24), (5.25) and (5.26)

$$
\begin{equation*}
v_{1}(1, \psi)-v_{1}\left(1, \psi^{\prime}\right) \leq q_{1}^{k^{*}}(\psi)-q_{1}^{k^{*}}\left(\psi^{\prime}\right)<\Delta_{1,1}^{k^{*}} q . \tag{5.27}
\end{equation*}
$$

When $i \neq 1$,

$$
\begin{array}{r}
v_{i}(1, \psi)-v_{i}\left(1, \psi^{\prime}\right) \leq s_{i}^{k_{1}}(0, \psi)-s_{i}^{k_{1}}\left(0, \psi^{\prime}\right) \\
 \tag{5.28}\\
=q_{i}^{k_{1}}(\psi)-q_{i}^{k_{1}}\left(\psi^{*}\right)=0 .
\end{array}
$$

Next let $n=2$ and assume $k_{1}=k$,

$$
s_{1}^{k *}(1, \psi)-s_{1}^{k^{*}}\left(1, \psi^{\prime}\right)=q_{1}^{k^{*}}(\psi)-q_{1}^{k^{*}}\left(\psi^{\prime}\right)
$$

$$
\begin{align*}
& +B\left[P _ { 1 , 1 } ^ { k ^ { * } } \left[\sum_{R} e_{1,1}^{k^{*}}(R ; \psi) v_{1}\left(1, T_{1,1}^{k^{*}}(R, \psi)\right)\right.\right. \\
& \left.-\sum_{R} \ell_{1,1}^{k^{*}}\left(R ; \psi^{\prime}\right) v_{1}\left(1, T_{1,1}^{k^{*}}\left(R, \psi^{\prime}\right)\right)\right] \\
& +\sum_{j=2}^{N} P_{1, j}^{k^{*}} \sum_{R} e_{1, j}^{k^{*}}(R ; \psi)\left(v_{j}\left(1, T_{1, j}^{k *}(R, \psi)\right)\right. \\
& \left.\left.-v_{j}\left(1, T_{1, j}^{k^{*}}\left(R, \psi^{\prime}\right)\right)\right)\right] \tag{5.29}
\end{align*}
$$

If two vectors $\psi_{1}$ and $\psi_{2}$ differ only with respect to the parameters of the distribution indexed by 1,1 and $k *$ and are such that $E_{1,1}^{k *}\left(R ; \psi_{1}\right)>E_{1,1}^{k *}\left(R ; \psi_{2}\right)$ then, in a manner identical to that used in equation (5.21), it can be shown that

$$
\begin{equation*}
0<q_{i}^{k *}\left(\psi_{1}\right)-q_{i}^{k^{*}}\left(\psi_{2}\right)<p_{1,1}^{k^{*}}\left(E_{1,1}^{k^{*}}\left(\psi_{1}\right)-E_{1,1}^{k^{*}}\left(\psi_{2}\right)\right)<\Delta_{1,1}^{k^{*}} q \tag{5.30}
\end{equation*}
$$

From condition (5.17) and equations (5.27) and (5.30),

$$
\begin{aligned}
& v_{1}\left(1, T_{1,1}^{k^{k}}\left(R(1), \psi_{\star}\right)\right) \geq v_{1}\left(1, \psi_{\star}\right) \geq v_{1}\left(1, T_{1,1}^{k^{k}}\left(R(2), \psi_{k}\right)\right), \psi_{\star}=\psi_{i} \psi^{\prime}
\end{aligned}
$$

$$
\begin{align*}
& \sum_{R} \ell_{1,1}^{k^{*}}\left(R ; \psi^{\prime}\right) v_{1}\left(1, T_{1,1}^{k *}\left(R, \psi^{\prime}\right)\right) \geq v_{i}\left(1, T_{1,1}^{k^{*}}(R(2), \psi)\right) . \tag{5.31}
\end{align*}
$$

Using the inequalities of (5.28) and (5.31), and since $\sum_{j=1}^{N} p_{i, j}^{k}=1$, $k=1,2, \ldots K_{i}, i=1,2, \ldots, \quad N$ equation (5.29) can be written

$$
s_{1}^{k^{*}}(1, \psi)-s_{1}^{k^{*}}\left(1, \psi^{\prime}\right)=q_{1}^{k^{*}}(\psi)-q_{1}^{k *}\left(\psi^{\prime}\right)
$$

$$
+\beta\left[P_{1,1}^{k^{*}}\left(v_{1}\left(1, T_{1,1}^{k *}(R(1), \psi)\right)-v_{1}\left(1, T_{1,1}^{k *}\left(R(2), \psi^{\prime}\right)\right)\right)\right.
$$

$$
+\sum_{j=2}^{N} p_{1, j}^{k^{*}} \sum_{R} e_{1, j}^{k^{\star}}\left(R _ { i } \psi _ { j } \left(v_{j}\left(1, T_{1, j}^{k \star}\left(R_{j}, \eta\right)\right)\right.\right.
$$

$$
\left.\left.-v_{j}\left(1, T_{1, j}^{k^{*}}\left(R, \psi^{\prime}\right)\right)\right)\right]
$$

$$
\leq q_{1}^{k^{*}}(\psi)-q_{1}^{k k^{*}}\left(\psi^{v}\right)+B\left(q_{1}^{k^{*}}\left(T_{1,1}^{k^{*}}(R(1), \psi)\right)\right.
$$

$$
\left.-q_{1}^{k^{*}}\left(T_{1,1}^{k^{k}}\left(R(2), \psi^{\prime}\right)\right)\right)
$$

$$
\begin{equation*}
<\Delta_{1,1}^{k \star} q+\beta \cdot \Delta_{1,1}^{k *} q \cdot \tag{5.32}
\end{equation*}
$$

Assuming $k_{1} \neq k$, and from equations (5.27) and (5.28),

$$
\begin{align*}
S_{1}^{k_{1}}(1, \psi) & -S_{1}^{k_{1}}\left(1, \psi^{\prime}\right)=q_{1}^{k_{1}}(\psi)-q_{1}^{k_{1}}\left(\psi^{\prime}\right) \\
& +B \sum_{j=1}^{N} p_{1, j}^{k_{1}} \sum_{R} e_{1, j}^{k_{1}}(R ; \psi)\left(v_{j}\left(1, T_{1, j}^{k_{1}}(R, \psi)\right)\right. \\
& \left.-v_{j}\left(1, T_{1, j}^{k_{1}}\left(R, \psi^{\prime}\right)\right)\right) \\
& \leq 3\left(q_{1}^{k^{*}}(\psi)-q_{1}^{k^{*}}\left(\psi^{\prime}\right)\right) \\
& <\beta \cdot \Delta_{1,1}^{k^{*}} q \cdot \tag{5.33}
\end{align*}
$$

From equations (5.22), (5.32) and (5.33),

$$
\begin{align*}
v_{1}(2, \psi) & -v_{1}\left(2, \psi^{\prime}\right) \leq q_{1}^{k *}(\psi)-q_{1}^{k^{*}}\left(\psi^{\prime}\right) \\
& +\beta\left(q_{1}^{k^{*}}\left(T_{1,1}^{k^{*}}\left(R(1), \psi^{\prime}\right)\right)-q_{1}^{k^{*}}\left(T_{1,1}^{k^{*}}\left(R(2), \psi^{\prime}\right)\right)\right) \\
& <\Delta_{1,1}^{k *} q+\beta \cdot \Delta_{1,1}^{k *} q, \tag{5.34}
\end{align*}
$$

and when $1 \neq 1$, from equations (5.22) and (5.27),

$$
\begin{align*}
v_{i}(2, \psi) & -v_{i}\left(2, \psi^{\prime}\right) \leq s_{i}^{k_{1}}(1, \psi)-s_{i}^{k_{1}}\left(1, \psi^{\prime}\right) \\
& =q_{i}^{k_{1}}(\psi)-q_{i}^{k_{1}}\left(\psi^{\prime}\right) \\
& +\varepsilon \sum_{j=1}^{N}{ }_{p_{i, j}}^{k_{1}} \sum_{R} e_{i, j}^{k_{1}}(R ; \psi)\left(v_{j}\left(1, T_{i, j}^{k_{1}}(R, \psi)\right)\right. \\
& \left.-v_{j}\left(1, T_{i, j}^{k_{1}}\left(R, \psi^{\prime}\right)\right)\right) \\
& \leq R\left(q_{i}^{k *}(\psi)-q_{i}^{k *}\left(\psi^{\prime}\right)\right) \\
& <\Delta_{1,1}^{k_{i}^{*}} q \quad . \tag{5.35}
\end{align*}
$$

When $\dot{\psi}$ is the vector containing the parameters of the prior distributions, denote the vector of parameters of the posterior distrioutions given $n$ observations of reward $R(l)$ from the distribution indexed by $i, j$ and $k$ by $\mathrm{T}_{i, j}^{k}\left(\mathrm{R}(\ell)^{\mathrm{n}}, \dot{\psi}\right)$. An inductive argument using equations (5.27), (5.34) and (5.35) establishes that

$$
\begin{aligned}
v_{1}(n, \psi) & -v_{1}\left(n, \psi^{\prime}\right) \leq q_{1}^{k^{*}}(\psi)-q_{1}^{k^{*}}\left(\psi^{\prime}\right) \\
& +\beta\left(q_{1}^{k^{*}}\left(T_{1,1}^{k^{*}}(R(1), \psi)\right)-q_{1}^{k^{*}}\left(T_{1,1}^{k^{*}}\left(R(2), \psi^{\prime}\right)\right)\right)
\end{aligned}
$$

$$
\begin{align*}
& +R^{2}\left(q_{1}^{k^{*}}\left(T_{1,1}^{k^{*}}\left(R(1)^{2}, \psi^{\prime}\right)\right)-q_{1}^{k *}\left(T_{1,1}^{k *}\left(R(2)^{2}, \psi^{\prime}\right)\right)\right) \\
& +\ldots+\beta^{n-1}\left(q_{1}^{k^{*}}\left(T_{1,1}^{k^{*}}\left(R(1)^{n-1}, \psi\right)\right)\right. \\
& \left.-q_{1}^{k *}\left(T_{1,1}^{k *}\left(R(2)^{n-1}, \psi^{r}\right)\right)\right) \\
& <\Delta_{1,1}^{k *} q\left(1+\beta+B^{2}+\ldots+B^{n-1}\right) \tag{5.36}
\end{align*}
$$

To obtain the upper bound for $v_{1}(\psi)-v_{1}\left(\psi^{\prime}\right)$ let $\Omega \rightarrow \infty$ in equation (5.36).

$$
\begin{align*}
v_{1}(\psi)-v_{1}\left(\psi^{\prime}\right)<\sum_{h=0}^{\infty} \Delta_{1,1}^{k^{*}} q \cdot B^{h} & =\Delta_{1,1}^{k^{*}} \uparrow \cdot \frac{1}{1-\rho} \\
& =P_{1,1}^{k^{*}} \frac{|R(1)-R(2)|}{1-j} \tag{5.37}
\end{align*}
$$

The lower bound of $v_{i}(\psi)-v_{i}\left(\psi^{\prime}\right)$ can be established by first writing the inequality

$$
\begin{align*}
v_{1}(n, \psi)-v_{1}\left(n, \psi^{\prime}\right) & =s_{1}^{k_{1}}(n-1, \psi)-s_{1}^{k_{2}}\left(n-1, \psi^{\prime}\right) \\
& \geq s_{1}^{k_{2}}(n-1, \psi)-s_{1}^{k_{2}}\left(n-1, \psi^{\prime}\right) \tag{5.38}
\end{align*}
$$

Let $:=1$ and assume first that $k_{2}=k *$, then that $k_{2} \neq k^{*}$. Since $\mathrm{q}_{1}^{\mathrm{k}^{*}}(\psi)-\mathrm{q}_{1}^{\mathrm{k} *}\left(\psi^{\prime}\right)>0$, and from equations (5.25), (5.26) and (5.38),

$$
\begin{equation*}
v_{1}(1, \psi)-v_{1}\left(1, \psi^{\prime}\right) \geq 0 \tag{5.39}
\end{equation*}
$$

When $n=2$ and assuming that alterative $k *$ is not chosen on either the first or second transition, then from equations (5.28), (5.33) and $(5.38)$

$$
\begin{equation*}
v_{1}(2, \psi)-v_{1}\left(2, \psi^{\prime}\right) \geq 0 \tag{5.40}
\end{equation*}
$$

An inductive argument can be used to show that

$$
\begin{equation*}
v_{1}(\psi)-v_{1}\left(\psi^{2}\right) \geq 0 \quad \text { Q.E.D. } \tag{5.4}
\end{equation*}
$$

Corollary 5.4. If $T_{ \pm{ }_{2}^{*}, j *}^{k *}(R(\ell *), \tilde{\psi})=\tilde{\psi}$ is such that

$$
\begin{equation*}
E_{i *, j *}^{k *}(R ; \tilde{\psi})<E_{i *, j *}^{k *}\left(R ; \tilde{\psi}^{0}\right) \tag{5.42}
\end{equation*}
$$

and if $R(1)$ and $R(2)$ are the possible rewards from the distribution indexed by $1 *, f *$ and $k *$, then

$$
\begin{align*}
& -P_{i *, j *}^{k *} \frac{\underline{R}(1)-R^{\prime} 9!}{1 \times i}<v_{i *}(\tilde{\psi})-v_{i *}\left(\tilde{\psi}^{\prime}\right) \leq 0, \\
& i *=1,2, \ldots N, \tag{5.43}
\end{align*}
$$

where $v_{i}(\psi)$ is defined in equation (4.10).

Proof. The direct substitution of $\tilde{\psi}^{\prime}$ for $\psi$ and $\bar{\psi}$ for $\psi^{\prime}$ in the proof of Theorem 5.3 is possible. Then

$$
\begin{aligned}
& 0 \leq v_{i *}\left(\tilde{\psi}^{\prime}\right)-v_{1 *}(\tilde{\psi})<p_{i *, f^{*}}^{k *} \frac{|R(1)-R(2)|}{1-\beta} \\
& \| \\
& -P_{i *, j *}^{k *} \frac{|R(1)-R(2)|}{1-\beta}<v_{i *}(\tilde{\psi})-\nabla_{i *^{*}}\left(\tilde{\psi}^{\prime}\right) \leq 0 \text {. Q.E.D. (5.44) }
\end{aligned}
$$

It is possible to modify Theorem 5.3 and Corollary 5.4 to obtain a bound which is less than $P_{i *, j *}^{k^{*}} \frac{|R(1)-R(2)|}{1-\beta}$. Suppose that the conditions of Theorem 5.3 are met and assume, without loss of generality that $i *=j *=1$ and $R(1)>R(2)$. Let

$$
\begin{align*}
\Delta_{1,1}^{k^{*}} q(n)= & q_{1}^{k^{*}}(\psi)-q_{1}^{k^{*}}\left(\psi^{\prime}\right) \\
& +B\left(q_{1}^{k^{*}}\left(T_{1,1}^{k^{*}}(R(1), \psi)\right)-q_{1}^{k *}\left(T_{1,1}^{k^{*}}\left(R(2), \psi^{\prime}\right)\right)\right) \\
& +\beta^{2}\left(q_{1}^{k^{*}}\left(T_{1,1}^{k^{*}}\left(R(1)^{2}, \psi\right)\right)-q_{1}^{k *}\left(T_{1,1}^{k^{*}}\left(R(2)^{2}, \psi^{\prime}\right)\right)\right) \\
& +\ldots+B^{n-1}\left(q_{1}^{k *}\left(T_{1,1}^{k^{*}}\left(R(1)^{n-1}, \psi\right)\right)\right. \\
& \left.-q_{1}^{k^{*}}\left(T_{1,1}^{k^{*}}\left(R(2)^{n-1}, \psi^{\prime}\right)\right)\right), \\
& n=1,2, \ldots \tag{5.45}
\end{align*}
$$

From equations (5.36) and (5.37)

$$
v_{i *}(\psi)-v_{i *}\left(\psi^{\prime}\right)<\Delta_{i \star, j *}^{k *} q(n)+\Delta_{i *, j *}^{k *} q \cdot \sum_{h=n}^{\infty} \beta^{h}
$$

$$
\begin{align*}
& =\Delta_{i *, j *}^{k^{*}} q(n)+\Delta_{i *, j^{*}}^{k ;} q \cdot \frac{B^{n}}{1-\beta} \\
& <\Delta_{i *, j^{*}}^{k^{*}} q \cdot \frac{1}{1-\beta}=p_{i *, j^{*}}^{k^{*}} \frac{\lfloor R(1)-R(2) \perp}{1-\beta}, \\
& n=1,2, \ldots \tag{5.46}
\end{align*}
$$

Therefore the quantity $p_{i *, j *}^{k^{*}} \frac{|R(1)-R(2)|}{1-\beta}$ can be replaced by $\Delta_{i *, j^{*}}^{k \star} q(n)+p_{i *, j^{*}}^{k \star}|R(1)-R(2)| \frac{\beta^{n}}{1-\beta}$ in Theorem 5.3 and Corollary 5.4.

The bounds for $v_{i}(\psi)-v_{i}\left(T_{i, j}^{k}(R, \psi)\right)$ will be used to obtain an upper bound for $v_{i}(\psi)$. Letting $T_{i, f}^{k}(R, \psi)=\psi^{\prime}$, the results of Theorem 5.3 and Corollary 5.4 can be written

$$
v_{i}\left(\psi^{\prime}\right)=v_{i}(\psi)+\theta_{i, j}^{k}(R, \psi) \Delta v_{i}\left(\psi^{\prime}\right),
$$

where

$$
\begin{align*}
& \Delta v_{i}\left(\psi^{\prime}\right)=P_{i, j}^{k} \frac{|R(1)-R(2)|}{1-B}, \quad E_{i, j}^{k}(R ; \psi)>E_{i, j}^{k}\left(R ; \psi^{\prime}\right) ; \\
& \Delta v_{i}\left(\psi^{\prime}\right)=-P_{i, j}^{k} \frac{|R(1)-R(2)|}{1-B}, \quad E_{i, j}^{k}(R ; \psi)<E_{i, j}^{k}\left(R ; \psi^{\prime}\right) ; \\
& 0 \leq \theta_{i, j}^{k}(R ; \psi) \leq 1, \\
& i, j=1,2, \ldots N, \quad k=1,2, \ldots K_{i}, \quad R=R(1), R(2) . \tag{5.47}
\end{align*}
$$

Using the notation of (5.47), equation (4.10) can now be written

$$
\begin{align*}
& v_{i}(\psi)= \max _{0 \leq k \leq K_{i}}\left\{a_{i}^{k}(\psi) \div B \sum_{j=1}^{N} p_{i, j}^{k} \sum_{R} e_{i, j}^{k}(R ; \psi)\right. \\
&\left.\times\left(v_{j}(\psi)+\theta_{i, j}^{k}(R, \psi) \Delta v_{j}\left(\mathbb{T}_{i, j}^{k}(R, \psi)\right)\right)\right\}, \\
& i=1,2, \ldots N, \quad R<R(1), R(2) \quad . \tag{5.48}
\end{align*}
$$

Let $\Omega=\left(\omega_{1}, \omega_{2}, \ldots \omega_{N}\right)=(\omega)$ denote a state stationary strategy where $\omega_{i}$ is the alterative to be chosen when the system is in state $i$, and define $w_{i}(\Omega, \psi)$ as

$$
\begin{align*}
w_{i}(\Omega, \psi)= & a_{i}^{\omega}(\psi)+6 \sum_{j=1}^{N} p_{i, j}^{\omega} \sum_{R} e_{i, j}^{\omega}(R ; \psi) \\
\times & \left(w_{j}(\Omega, \psi)+\theta_{i, j}^{\omega}(R, \psi) \Delta v_{j}\left(T_{i, j}^{\omega}(R, \psi)\right)\right) \\
= & \sum_{j=1}^{N} p_{i, j}^{\omega} \sum_{R} \ell_{i, j}^{\omega}(R ; \psi)\left(R+\varepsilon e_{i, j}^{\omega}(R, \psi)\right. \\
\times & \left.\Delta v_{j}\left(T_{i, j}^{\omega}(R, \psi)\right)\right)+\beta \sum_{j=1}^{N} P_{i, j}^{\omega} w_{j}(\Omega, \psi), \\
& i=1,2, \ldots N, \quad R=R(1 j, R(2) . \tag{5.49}
\end{align*}
$$

To express the set of equations of (5.49) in matrix form let

$$
W(\Omega, \psi)=\operatorname{coL}\left[w_{1}(\Omega, \psi), w_{2}(\Omega, \psi), \ldots w_{N}(\Omega, \psi)\right],
$$

$$
\begin{aligned}
& D(\Omega, \psi)=\operatorname{coL}\left[d_{1}^{\omega}(\psi), d_{2}^{\omega}(\psi), \ldots d_{N}^{\omega}(\psi)\right],
\end{aligned}
$$

where

$$
\begin{align*}
d_{i}^{\omega}(\psi)= & \sum_{j=1}^{N} p_{i, j}^{\omega} \sum_{R} e_{i, j}^{\omega}(R ; \psi)\left(R+\beta \theta_{i, j}^{\omega}(R, \psi)\right. \\
& \left.\times \Delta v_{j}\left(T_{i, j}^{\omega}(R, \psi)\right)\right) \quad . \tag{5.50}
\end{align*}
$$

Express the set of equations (5.49) as

$$
\begin{align*}
& W(\Omega, \psi)=D(\Omega, \psi)+\beta P(\Omega) W(\Omega, \psi), \\
& W(\Omega, \psi)-\beta P(\Omega) W(\Omega, \psi)=D(\Omega, \psi) \\
& {[I-\beta P(\Omega)] W(\Omega, \psi)=D(\Omega, \psi),} \\
& W(\Omega, \psi)=[I-\beta P(\Omega)]^{-1} D(\Omega, \psi) . \tag{5.51}
\end{align*}
$$

Howard (12, p. 82) has shown that $[I-\beta P(\Omega)]^{-1}$ exists and has nonnegative elements. Note that equation (5.49) is of the same functional form as equation (5.48), and that the set of all state stationary strategies, denoted by $\Delta(\Omega)$, is finite. Calculation of $W(\Omega, \psi)$ is equivalent to Howard's value determination operation, and the policy improvement routine will determine $\Omega *$ such that

$$
\begin{align*}
v_{i}(\psi) & =\max _{\Omega \varepsilon \Delta(\Omega)}\left\{w_{i}(\Omega, \psi)\right\}=w_{i}(\Omega *, \psi), \\
i & =1,2, \ldots N . \tag{5.52}
\end{align*}
$$

Letting $\Omega^{*}=\left(\omega_{1}^{*}, \omega_{2}^{*}, \ldots \omega_{N}^{*}\right)=\left(\omega^{*}\right)$ and the $N \times N$ matrix

$$
\begin{aligned}
{[I-B P(\Omega *)]^{-1}=} & c=\left[c_{i, j}\right], i, j=1,2, \ldots N, \text { then } \\
v_{i}(\psi)= & \sum_{j=1}^{N} c_{i, j} d_{j}^{\omega^{*}} \ldots \\
= & \sum_{j=1}^{N} c_{i, j} \sum_{h=1}^{N} p_{j, h}^{\omega *} \sum_{R}^{l_{j, h}^{\omega_{j}^{*}}(R ; \psi)} \\
& \times\left(R+\beta \theta_{j, h}^{\omega_{j}^{*}}(R, \psi) \Delta v_{h}\left(T_{j, h}^{\omega_{j}^{*}}(R, \psi)\right)\right) \\
< & \sum_{j=1}^{N} c_{i, j} \sum_{h=1}^{N} p_{j, h}^{\omega_{j}^{*}} \sum_{R} \ell_{j, h}^{\omega^{*}}(R ; \psi)
\end{aligned}
$$

$$
\begin{align*}
& \times\left(R+\rho \quad \max _{0 \leq v_{j, h}^{i \omega *}(R, \psi) \leq 1}^{\left.\left\{e_{j, h}^{(\nu *}(R, \psi) \Delta v_{h}\left(T_{j, h}^{\omega *}(R, \psi)\right)\right\}\right)}\right. \\
& =\sum_{j=1}^{N} c_{i, h} \sum_{h=1}^{N} p_{j, h}^{\omega^{*}} \sum_{R} 2_{j, h}^{\omega^{*}}(R ; \psi) \\
& x\left(R+\beta\left\{\max 0 ; \Lambda v_{h}\left(T_{j, h}^{\omega^{*}}(R, \psi)\right)\right\}\right), \\
& i=1,2, \ldots N, \quad R=R(1), R(2) \quad . \tag{5.53}
\end{align*}
$$

Let

$$
\begin{align*}
F_{i, j}^{k}(\psi) & =\sum_{R} e_{i, j}^{k}(R ; \psi)\left(R+\beta \max \left\{0 ; \Delta v_{j}\left(T_{i, j}^{k}(R, \psi)\right)\right\}\right) \\
& =\dot{E}_{i, j}^{k}(R ; \psi)+\sum_{R} e_{i, j}^{k}(R ; \psi) \beta \max \left\{0 ; \Delta v_{j}\left(T_{i, j}^{k}(R, \psi)\right)\right\}, \\
\hat{a}_{i}^{k}(\psi) & =\sum_{j=1}^{N} \mathbb{p}_{i, j}^{k} F_{i, j}^{k}(\psi) \tag{5.54}
\end{align*}
$$

and, for a state stationary strategy $\Omega$, let

$$
\begin{align*}
& \hat{Q}(\Omega, \psi)=\operatorname{coL}\left[\hat{q}_{1}^{\omega}(\psi), \hat{q}_{2}^{\omega}(\psi), \ldots \hat{\eta}_{n}^{\omega}(\psi)\right], \\
& U(\Omega, \psi)=\operatorname{coL}\left[u_{1}(\Omega, \psi), u_{2}(\Omega, \psi), \ldots u_{n}(\Omega, \psi)\right] \quad . \tag{5.55}
\end{align*}
$$

Then, for some $\Omega \varepsilon \Delta(\Omega)$, the last line of equation (5.53) can be set equal to $u_{i}(\Omega *, \psi)$ and written in matrix form as

$$
\begin{align*}
& U(\Omega *, \psi)=[I-\beta P(\Omega *)]^{-1} \hat{Q}(\Omega *, \psi), \\
& U\left(\Omega^{*}, \psi\right)=\hat{Q}(\Omega *, \psi)+\beta P(\Omega *) U(\Omega *, \psi), \tag{5.56}
\end{align*}
$$

so that

$$
\begin{align*}
u_{i}(\Omega *, \psi) & =\sum_{j=1}^{N} p_{i, j}^{\omega *} F_{i, j}^{\omega^{*}}(\psi)+\beta \sum_{j=1}^{N} p_{i, j}^{\omega *} u_{i}(\Omega *, \psi) \\
1 & =1,2, \ldots N \tag{5.57}
\end{align*}
$$

Because the $\theta_{i, j}^{k}(R, \psi)$ of equation (5.49) are unknown, the strategy $\Omega_{i} *$ which was defined in equation (5.52) is also unknown. There is, however, a strategy $\hat{\Omega}$ such that $u_{i}(\hat{\Omega}, \psi)=\max _{\Omega \in \Delta(\Omega)}\left\{u_{i}(\Omega, \psi)\right\} \geq u_{i}(\Omega * ; \psi)$. Let

$$
\begin{align*}
F(\psi)= & a \quad 1 \times L \text { vector containing the values } \cdot F_{i, j}(\psi) \\
& \text { for all } i, j \text { and } k . \tag{5.58}
\end{align*}
$$

Since, for fixed $k$, equation (5.2) is of the same functional form as equation (5.57), the following equation can be written.

$$
u_{i}(\psi *, \psi) \leq u_{i}(\hat{\Omega}, \psi)-u_{i}(F(\psi))
$$

$$
\begin{align*}
& =\max _{1 \leq k \leq k_{i}}\left\{\sum_{j=1}^{N} p_{i, j}^{k} F_{i, j}^{k}(\psi)+\beta \sum_{j=1}^{N} p_{i, j}^{k} u_{j}(F(\psi))\right\} \\
i & =1=2, \ldots N, \tag{5.59}
\end{align*}
$$

and the set of solutions $\left\{u_{i}(F(\psi))\right\}$ can be obtained by application of Howard's iterative procedure.

Theorem 5.5. If $u_{i}(F(\psi))$ is the solution to equation (5.59), where $F(\psi)$ is defined in (5.58) and equation (5.54), and $v_{i}(\psi)$ is the solution to equation (4.10), then

$$
\begin{equation*}
v_{i}(\psi)<u_{i}(F(\psi)), \quad i=1,2, \ldots N . \tag{5.60}
\end{equation*}
$$

Proof. From equations (5.53) and (5.59),

$$
\begin{align*}
v_{i}(\psi)< & \sum_{j=1}^{N} c_{1, j} \sum_{h=1}^{N} p_{j, h}^{\omega_{j}^{k}} \sum_{R} l_{j, h}^{\omega_{j}^{k}}(R ; \psi) \\
& \times\left(R+3 \max \left\{0 ; \Delta v_{h}\left(T_{j, h}^{\omega k}(R, \psi)\right)\right\}\right) \\
\leq & E_{i}(F(\psi)), \\
1 & =1,2, \ldots N \quad . \tag{5.61}
\end{align*}
$$

Theorems 5.1 and 5.5 establish the following bounds for $v_{i}(\psi)$,

$$
\begin{align*}
u_{i}(E(R ; \psi)) & \leq v_{i}(\psi)<u_{i}(F(\psi)), \\
1 & =1,2, \ldots N \tag{5.62}
\end{align*}
$$

Theorem 5.6. If the state stationary strategy associated with $u_{i}(E(R ; \psi))$ is

$$
\begin{equation*}
\Omega(E(R ; \psi))=\left(\omega_{1}, \omega_{2}, \ldots \omega_{N}\right), \tag{5.63}
\end{equation*}
$$

and if

$$
\begin{aligned}
u_{i}(E(R ; \psi)) \geq & q_{i}^{k^{\prime}}(\psi)+3 \sum_{j=1}^{N} p_{i, j}^{k^{\prime}} \sum_{R} e_{i, j}^{k^{\prime}}(R ; \psi) \\
& \times u_{j}\left(F\left(T_{i, j}^{k^{\prime}}(R, \psi)\right)\right)
\end{aligned}
$$

$$
\begin{equation*}
\text { where } k^{\prime} \text { is the set of all } k \neq \omega_{i}, k=1,2, \ldots K_{i} \text {, } \tag{5.64}
\end{equation*}
$$

then

$$
\begin{align*}
v_{i}(\psi)= & q_{i}^{\omega_{i}}(\psi)+\beta \sum_{j=1}^{N} p_{i, j}^{\omega_{i}} \sum_{R} e_{i, j}^{\omega_{i}}(R ; \psi) \\
& \times v_{j}\left(T_{i, j}^{\omega_{i}}(R, \psi)\right) . \tag{5.65}
\end{align*}
$$

Proof. Since it was shown in Theorem 5.5 that $v_{1}(\psi)<u_{1}(F(\psi))$, then

$$
q_{i}^{k}(\psi)+\beta \sum_{j=1}^{N} p_{i, j}^{k} \sum_{R} e_{i, j}^{k}(R ; \psi) v_{j}\left(T_{i, j}^{k}, \psi\right)
$$

$$
\begin{align*}
& <q_{i}^{k}(\psi)+B \sum_{j=1} p_{i, j}^{k} \sum_{R} e_{i, j}^{k}(R ; \psi) u_{j}\left(F\left(T_{i, j}^{k}(R, \psi)\right)\right) \\
& i=1,2, \ldots N, \quad k=1,2, \ldots k_{i} \quad \tag{5.66}
\end{align*}
$$

Theorem 5.1 showed that $v_{i}(\psi) \geq u_{i}(E(R ; \psi)$ ). If condition (5.64) is true for all $k^{\prime}$, then, since $k^{\prime} \dot{U} \omega_{i}=k, k=1,2, \ldots K_{i}$,

$$
\begin{align*}
v_{i}(\psi) \geq & u_{i}(E(R ; \psi)) \geq q_{i}^{k^{\prime}}(\psi)+\beta \sum_{j=1}^{N} P_{i, j}^{k^{\prime}} \sum_{R} e_{i, j}^{k^{\prime}}(R ; \psi) \\
& \times u_{j}\left(F\left(T_{i, j}^{k^{\prime}}(R, \psi)\right)\right) \\
> & q_{i}^{k^{\prime}}(\psi)+\beta \sum_{j=1}^{N} p_{i, j}^{k^{\prime}} \sum_{R} e_{i, j}^{k^{\prime}}(R ; \psi) v_{j}\left(T_{i, j}^{k^{\prime}}(R, \psi)\right) \\
v_{i}(\psi)= & q_{i}(\psi)+\theta \sum_{j=1}^{N} P_{i, j}^{\omega_{i}} \sum_{R} e_{i, j}^{\omega_{i}}(R ; \psi) v_{j}\left(T_{i, j}^{\omega_{i}}(R, \psi)\right) .
\end{align*}
$$

If the conditions of Theorem 5.6 are met the decision maker can determine the optimal alternative to govern the next transition. If the conditions are not met it may be desirable to recalculate $\Delta v_{j}\left(\psi^{\prime}\right)$ using the modified bounds for $v_{i}(\psi)-v_{i}\left(T_{i, j}^{k}(R, \psi)\right)$ suggested in equation (5.46). This will reduce the value of $\frac{k}{\sum_{i, j}}(\psi)$ which in tum will reduce
$u_{i}(F(\psi))$; the change may be enough so that the modified calculations will meet the conditions of Theorem 5.6. If the conditions of Theorem 5.6 can not be met, it is necessary to revert to a solution which is a variation of solution by successive approximations.

Theorem 5.7. If $v_{i}(n, \psi, L)$ and $v_{i}(n, \psi, U)$ are defined as

$$
\begin{aligned}
v_{i}(n, \psi, L)= & \max _{1 \leq k \leq K_{i}}\left\{q_{i}^{k}(\psi)+B \sum_{j=1}^{N} p_{i, j}^{k} \sum_{R} e_{i, j}^{k}(R ; \psi)\right. \\
& \left.\times v_{j}\left(n-1, T_{1, j}^{k}(R, \psi), L\right)\right\}, \\
n & =1,2, \cdots, \\
v_{i}(0, \psi, L) & =u_{i}(E(R, \psi)),
\end{aligned}
$$

and

$$
\begin{align*}
& v_{i}(n, \psi, U)=\max _{1 \leq k \leq k_{i}}\left\{q_{i}^{k}(\psi)+\beta \sum_{j=1}^{N} p_{i, j}^{k} \sum_{R} e_{i, j}^{k}(R ; \psi)\right. \\
&\left.\left.\times v_{j}\left(n-1, T_{i, j}^{k}(R, \dot{\psi}), U\right)\right)\right\}, \\
& n=1,2, \cdots, \\
& v_{i}(0, \psi, L)=u_{i}(F(\psi)), \\
& i=1,2, \cdots N, \quad R=R(1), R(2) \tag{5.68}
\end{align*}
$$

and if $n$ is such that

$$
\begin{aligned}
v_{i}(n, \psi, L)= & q_{i}^{k^{\star}}(\psi)+B \sum_{j=1}^{N} p_{i, j}^{k^{*}} \sum_{\mathbb{R}} e_{i, j}^{k^{*}}(R ; \psi) \\
& \times v_{j}\left(n-1, T_{i, j}^{k^{*}}(R, \psi), L\right),
\end{aligned}
$$

and

$$
\begin{aligned}
v_{i}(n, \psi, L) \geq & a_{i}^{k^{\prime}}(\psi)+\beta \sum_{j=1}^{N} p_{1, j}^{k^{\prime}} \sum_{R} e_{1, j}^{k^{\prime}}(R ; \psi) \\
& \times v_{j}\left(n-1, T_{i, j}^{k^{\prime}}(R, \psi), U\right),
\end{aligned}
$$

$$
\begin{equation*}
\text { where } k^{\prime} \text { is the set of all } k \neq k *, k=1,2, \ldots k_{i} \tag{5.69}
\end{equation*}
$$

then

$$
\begin{equation*}
v_{i}(\psi)=q_{i}^{k^{*}}(\psi)+\beta \sum_{j=1}^{N} p_{i, j}^{k^{*}} \sum_{R} e_{i, j}^{k^{*}}\left(R_{i} \psi\right) v_{j}\left(T_{i, j}^{k^{*}}\left(R_{i} \psi\right)\right) \tag{5.70}
\end{equation*}
$$

Proof. An inductive argument will be used to establish that

$$
\begin{equation*}
v_{i}(n, \psi, U)>v_{i}(\psi) \geq v_{i}(n, \psi, L) \tag{5.71}
\end{equation*}
$$

Theorem 5.1 shows that $v_{i}(\psi) \geq u_{i}(E(R ; \psi))$, so that

$$
1
$$

$$
v_{i}(2, \psi, L) \leq v_{i}(\psi) ;
$$

and by induction

$$
\begin{aligned}
& q_{i}^{k}(\psi)+\beta \sum_{j=1}^{N} P_{i, j}^{k} \sum_{R} e_{i, j}^{k}(R ; \psi) u_{j}\left(E\left(R ; T_{i, j}^{k}(R, \psi)\right)\right) \\
& \leq q_{i}^{k}(\psi)+\beta \sum_{j=1}^{N} p_{i, j}^{k} \sum_{R} e_{i, j}^{k}(R ; \psi) v_{j}\left(T_{i, j}^{k}(R ; \psi)\right), \\
& k=1,2, \ldots N \\
& 1 \\
& v_{i}(1, \psi, L) \leq v_{i}(\psi) ; \\
& q_{i}^{k}(\psi)+\beta \sum_{j=1}^{N} p_{i, j}^{k} \sum_{R} e_{i, j}^{k}(R ; \psi) v_{j}\left(1, T_{i, j}^{k}(R, \psi), L\right) \\
& \leq q_{i}^{k}(\psi)+\beta \sum_{j=1}^{N} p_{i, j}^{k} \sum_{R} e_{i, j}^{k}(R ; \psi) v_{j}\left(T_{i, j}^{k}(R, \psi)\right), \\
& k=1,2, \ldots N
\end{aligned}
$$

$$
\begin{align*}
& q_{i}^{k}(\psi)+\beta \sum_{j=1}^{N} p_{i, j}^{k} \sum_{R} e_{i, j}^{k}(R ; \psi) v_{j}\left(n-1, T_{i, j}^{k}(R ; \psi), L\right) \\
& \leq q_{i}^{k}(\psi)+\beta \sum_{j=1}^{N} p_{i, j}^{k} \sum_{R} e_{i, j}^{k}(R ; \psi) v_{j}\left(T_{i, j}^{k}(R, \psi)\right), \\
& k=1,2, \ldots N \\
& v_{i}(n, \psi, L) \leq v_{i}(\psi) \quad \tag{5.72}
\end{align*}
$$

By a similar argument it is easily shown that

$$
\begin{align*}
& \quad q_{i}^{k}(\psi)+\beta \sum_{j=1}^{N} P_{i, j}^{k} \sum_{R} e_{i, j}^{k}(R ; \psi) v_{f}\left(n-1, T_{i, j}^{k}(R ; \psi), U\right) \\
& > \\
& >q_{i}^{k}(\psi)+\beta \sum_{j=1}^{N} P_{i, j}^{k} \sum_{R} e_{i, j}^{k}(R ; \psi) v_{j}\left(T_{i, j}^{k}(R ; \psi)\right), \\
& k=1,2, \ldots N \\
& \quad V_{i}(n, \psi, U)>v_{i}(\psi) . \tag{5,73}
\end{align*}
$$

Suppose that there is a $n$ such that condition (5.69) is met. Since

$$
k * U k^{\prime}=k, k=1,2, \ldots K_{i}
$$

$$
v_{i}(\psi)>v_{i}(n, \psi, L) \geq q_{i}^{k^{\prime}}(\psi)+\rho \sum_{j=1}^{N} p_{i, j}^{k^{\prime}} \sum_{R} e_{i, j}^{k^{\prime}}(R ; \psi)
$$

$$
\times v_{f}\left(n-1, T_{i, f}^{k^{\prime}}(R, \psi), U\right)
$$

$$
>q_{i}^{k^{\prime}}(\psi)+B \sum_{j=1}^{N} p_{i, j}^{k^{\prime}} \sum_{R} i_{i, j}^{k^{\prime}}(R ; \psi) v_{j}\left(T_{i, j}^{k^{\prime}}(R, \psi)\right)
$$

$$
v_{i}(\psi)=q_{i}^{k *}(\psi)+\beta \sum_{j=1}^{N} p_{i, j}^{k^{*}} \sum_{R} e_{i, j}^{k^{*}}(R ; \psi) v_{j}\left(T_{i, j}^{k *}(R, \psi)\right)
$$

Q.E.D.

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